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der control. With this went an extraordinarily warm heart,
great kindliness, and lively sympathy always for the poor,
the friendless, and the oppressed. His wit was quick and
keen and occasionally a bit caustic, his mind alert, his judg
ment excellent.
He carrie to Chicago in 1874 and for many years there
after was continuously in the trial of jury cases, literally
going from one courtroom to another, day after day. He
was a fmn believer in trial
by jury as one of the great bul
warks of our liberties; but he also thought that in civil cases
trial by jury as at common law should be restored; that

judges should

be

permitted

to

charge juries orally,

without

written instructions, and to comment on the facts. He once
said he thought he had tried five or six hundred jury cases,

though in the last fifteen years or so of his
of
his
cases came from other
life
lawyers and very
after
they had been lost in the lower court.
frequently
After his first few years at the Bar, he became associated
with the firm of Tenney and Flower. Dan Tenney, senior
member, was an uncle of Horace Kent Tenney, who was for
years at the head of the Bar of Chicago, and father of
Henry F. Tenney, who stands in the same high position to
day-a worthy and distinguished son, ably carrying on in
the best tradition of his illustrious sire. My father used to

perhaps

Mr.

Tappan Gregory during

his lecture in Breasted Hall

Stephen Strong Gregory
By
A lecture

TAPPAN GREGORY,

given by

Mr.

Gregory

in

School. The lecture is the first in

a

ESQ.

October, 1956
series

at

The Law

of lectures on

eminent

lawyers.
It is with no little diffidence that J present the observations
that follow, for Stephen Strong Gregory was my father.
He and I were very close to each other, and it was my good
fortune to be associated with him professionally for the last
ten years of his life. I do not wish to picture him to
you as
a
paragon of any sort. He had his faults; he made mistakes
as all men do; he was human.
He was bor� in Unadilla, New York, on November !6,
1849; moved to Madison, Wisconsin, at the age of eight;
and was educated at the University of Wisconsin, where
he took his A.B. and LL.B. degrees in 1870 and I87!, re
spectively. Later he declined an honorary LL.D. degree
from the same institution because he did not favor
degrees
not representing actual work done.
In his younger days he was
possessed of a very quick
temper, which years of self-discipline brought largely un-

more,

most

quote Dan Tenney as saying that every well-organized law
office should have at least one lawyer in it.
At the request of Clarence Darrow, he joined in the de
fense of Debs in the contempt and conspiracy proceedings
before Judges Woods and Grosscup in the United States
Circuit Court in Chicago-without compensation. He held
the opinion that labor unions were legitimate and
necessary
in affording the laboring man
adequate protection of his
rights and that the members of a union had a right to strike
and to urge others to strike. But he believed that
every
effort should be made to adjust controversies between em
ployer and employee by voluntary arbitration before re
sorting to strikes; and he always counseled earnestly against
any action involving force or violence, threats of violence,
or efforts to intimidate those whom it was
sought to per
suade.

Eugene

V. Debs

was

president of the American Railway
Continued

on

page 16
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The Class

of 1959

When the academic year I956-57 began last October, one
largest entering classes in the School's history began
the work of the first year. One hundred and forty-two stu
dents, chosen from among 48I applicants, made up the en
of the

tering

class.

As in the past, many alumni have

expressed

an

interest

the origins of the student body, both in terms of their
home communities and of the colleges from which they re

as

to

ceived their

undergraduate

education. The

current

student

body consists of 323 students who have attended 172 dif
ferent colleges and universities located in all parts of the
The Wormser Scholar: Dallin H. Oaks, Provo, Utah; A.B.,

Brigham

Young University.

United States and in foreign countries. Institutions current
ly represented by members of the student body are:

University of Alabama
College
American Conservatory
Albion

of

Music

Amherst College
Antioch College

Armstrong College of Savannah
University of Athens
Aurora College
Austin College
Baghdad Law School

Bard

College
College
Beloit College
Boston University
Bowdoin College
Bradley University
Brandeis University
Brigham Young University
University of British Columbia
Brooklyn College
Brown University
Bryn Mawr University
University of Buffalo
University of California (L.A.)
Calvin College
Carleton College
Central State College
University of Chicago
City College of New York
Colby College
Colgate University
University of Colorado
Columbia University
University of Connecticut
Cornell College (Iowa)
Cornell University
Bates

.

The Class

of 1915 Scholar: Robert Zener, Pittsburgh; A.B., University
of Chicago; London School of Economics.

Culver-Stockton College
Dartmouth College

Davidson

College
University
University
Drake University
Drew University
Earlham College
Elmhurst College
De Paul
DePauw

Emory University
The

Raymond Scholars: Amy Scupi,

New

York; A.B., Queens Col
lege; Walter Clements, South Bend; A.B., University of Notre Dame;
A.M., University of Ottawa.

Far Eastern University
University of Genova
George Washington Law

School

Georgetown University
Goethe University
University of Grenoble
Grinnell College
University of Hamburg
Hamilton College
Harvard University
Haverford College
University of Hawaii
Hebrew University
Holy Cross, College of the
Hope College
University of Illinois
Illinois Institute of Technology

Indiana

University
James Millikin University
John Marshall Law School
Joliet Junior College
Kalamazoo College
University of Kansas
Kent University
University of Kentucky
Kenyon College
La fa yette College
Lake Forest College
Lincoln University

London School of Economics
Louisiana State

University
University of Louisville
Loyola University
Macalester College
University of Maine
Marquette University
Maryville College
Mercer University
Mexico City College
University of Michigan
Michigan State University
University of Mississippi
Morehouse College
Morningside College
Marion Junior College
Murray State College
University of Nebraska
Nebraska Wesleyan University
University of New Mexico
New Mexico Military Institute
University of North Dakota
University College of North
Staffordshire

Northwestern

University

The
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University of Chicago

University
College
Ohio State University
Ohio Wesleyan University
University of Oregon
University of Ottawa
Palos Verdes College
University of Pennsylvania
Pepper dine College
Pomona College
Princeton University
Puget Sound, College of
Purdue University
Queens College
Reed College
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

Stanford University
University of Stockholm
Swarthmore College
Syracuse University
University of Talladega
Temple University
Texas Christian University
Texas Western University
Thornton Junior College
University of Toronto
Trinity College
Tufts College
Union Theological Seminary
University of Tubingen

Rice Institute

University of British Columbia
Valparaiso University
Vanderbilt University
University of Virginia
Wabash College
Washington State College
Washington University
Washington and Jefferson College
Wayne University
Wesleyan University
Western College for Women
Western Kentucky State Teachers College
Wheaton College
Whitman College
Whittier College
Wilson Junior College
University of Wisconsin
Wittenberg College
Woodrow Wilson City College
Wright Junior College
Yale University

Notre Dame

Oberlin

Ripon College
University of Rochester
Roosevelt University
Rutgers University
St. Bonaventure University
St. John's College
St. Joseph College
St. Louis University
St. Mary of the Lake Seminary
St. Mary's College
St. Olaf College
Sampson College
University of Santo Tomas
Shimer College
University of South Dakota
Southeast Missouri State Col-

lege

Un�versity

of Southern Califor-

ma

University

of Southern Illinois

Sorbonne, The
Southern Methodist

From the

of the
as

point

States

of view of geographic

student

origin,

Alabama
Arkansas
California
Colorado

Tennessee

Iowa
Kansas

Kentucky
Maine

Maryland

New

Texas
Utah

Washington
Wisconsin

Foreign

Countries:

Australia

Canada

Michigan

Germany

New Jersey
New Mexico
New York

Mary Beecher Scholar: Mrs. Miriam Chesslin Feigelson,
York; A.B., Western College for Womell, Miami, Ohio.

Rhode Island

England

Nebraska

The

Oregon

Massachusetts
Minnesota
Missouri

members

Ohio

Delaware
Florida

Illinois

Cross, Milwaukee.

Oklahoma

Pennsylvania

Indiana

The Blake Scholar: Robert Martineau, Oconto, Wisconsin; B.S., Col

lege of the Holy

North Dakota
South Dakota

Connecticut
District of Columbia

Georgia

Guard

body

follows:

Hawaii

Coast

3

Academy

represent thirty-five states, the
Columbia, Hawaii, and ten foreign countries

current

District of

University

United

Law School

Greece

Iraq
Italy

Jordan
New Zealand

Sweden

The phi

Sigma Delta Scholar:
University of Chicago.

B. Z.

Goodwin,Miami Beach; A.B.,
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Report

on

the Class

after Thirty
By
Of

of 1926

Years

ELMER P. SCHAEFER, '26

class members, fifty-four responded to a
questionnaire. Thirty years after graduation finds 1926
middle-aged, still working for their individual objectives
and serving in their chosen field. A representative member
of the class, Richard Bevan Austin, one of the greatest

sixty-five

prosecutors Cook County, Illinois, has ever had, was nearly
elected governor of Illinois in 1956.
While this class was "between the wars" from a military
point of view, ten members saw wartime military service,
three of them in both world wars.
Most of the class are practicing law, with Chicago's
La Salle Street the favorite location.
are

residents of fifteen different

states

Geographically, they
and of the District of

Columbia.
Of those practicing law, eight are the senior partners in
law firms. Past or present, there are five law professors or
instructors and nine in the federal governmental service;
four judges, one of whom is a judge of a state supreme
court; three masters-in-chancery, or referees; five prosecut
ing attorneys; four city attorneys, or special municipal
counsel; two are in suburban practice; and one has prac
ticed in France. There are five bank or corporation presi
dents or vice-presidents. Nine are chief counsel for private
corporations. There are two railroad general counsel, and
one is
president of the Association of American Law
Schools.
There are six authors, five of whom have confined their
writings chiefly to the field of law. There have been two
college trustees or board members. There are two long
time members of the Illinois State Legislature, Senator
Meritt Little and Legislator Richard Harewood; two title

The Law and Behavioral Sciences Senior Fellows: Richard H. Jones,
Professor of History, Reed College; Alfred Lindesmith, Professor of

Sociology, Indiana University; and Philip Seiznick, Professor of So
ciology, University of California.

officers of title
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six have been bar association
of
members
boards of managers of bar
presidents; three,
associations. The activities of class members on school
boards and in community activities have been too numer
ous to mention. Almost without
exception the question
naires revealed intense activity in fields other than law and
the expenditure of large amounts of time and
energy in

companies;

educational, charitable, religious, legal, literary, military,
and

community causes. It is regretted that there is not space
detail all these activities. The replies were also note
worthy for their brevity. Your scrivener has several times
added important facts known to him and omitted by the
answer in the
questionnaires. Most of the class have served
extensively on bar association committees, from the Ameri
can Bar Association to local
city, county, and area bar asso
ciations.
to

Collectively the members of the class have eighty-four
children and fourteen grandchildren. Most of the children
are in their teens or
younger. Gaylord Toft, for example,
has four sons under eight, while A. S. Thorwaldson lists
four grandchildren. There is one set of girl twins and one
set of
boy twins among the eighty-four children, and
among the grandchildren is the illustrious name of Floyd
Russell Mechem II. While inadvertently omitted from the
questionnaire, four members volunteered the fact that their
wives attended the University of Chicago. Three class
members are practicing law with their sons, and four sons
of class members are lawyers; and thirteen more children
of class members intend to be lawyers.
The following biographical outlines are taken almost ex
clusively from answers submitted to the recent question
naire.

ABRAHAMS, JEROME L.,� resides at 1456 Sheridan Rd., Highland
Park, Illinois, and practices law at 38 S. Dearborn St., Chicago.
He is

a

partner in the firm of David Fainman and Abrahams and

Justice Brennan, newly appointed to the Supreme Court of the
United States, lunched recently with residents of Mead House, the Law
School Residence. He is shown being greeted by students upon his arrival.

Mr.

The
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the father of Richard L. and Mrs. Barbara Grossman. He has three
grandchildren: Glen D. Abrahams, three years; Marc S. Abra
hams, eleven months; and Michael L. Grossman, one and a half

BADE, CARL A., resides at 3434 W. 71st Pl., Chicago, and his
office address is 165 N. Canal St. He has been a referee for the Illi
nois Department of Labor since 1939. Carl is married and has

years

two sons,

.

.

ALSCHULER, JACOB

E., resides

at

143 Le Grande

Blvd., Aurora,

Illinois, and offices at 32 Water St., Aurora, where he is a partner
with his brother, Sam Alschuler, '35, in the law firm of Putnam
Johnson and Alschuler. He is married to Carolyn Straus Alschuler,

Carl Allen and Robert Harold. He

BAYSE, PAUL E., resides

stein, twenty-six; Benjamin P., twenty-three; and George A.,
twenty-one. Both of the sons plan to study law and one is plan
ning to attend The University of Chicago Law School. There is
one
grandson, Daniel Arthur Goldstein, fifteen months. Jacob was
a member of the Illinois State Normal School Board from 1935 to
1943 and chairman of the Kane County Democratic Central Com

has been for

to 1942.

former member of the Indiana State Board of Law Examiners.

Justice Arterburn is married and the father of three daughters,
Joan Marie, Linda L., and Faith E. Active in many Indiana frater
nal and charitable organizations, Justice Arterburn taught law for
one year at Washburn
College of Law and was successively prose
cuting attorney, practicing attorney, senior member of his law
firm, and visiting professor at the University of Indiana School of
Law. He has contributed law-review articles

Michigan, Pennsylvania,

to

the Illinois,

AUSTIN, RICHARD BEVAN, resides at 2634 Park Dr., Flossmoor,
may be addressed as Judge of the Superior Court
of Cook County, Cook County Building, Chicago. Judge Austin
is married and has three sons, Richard W., who was admitted to
practice in October, 1955; David C.; and Robert B.; and one

Illinois, and he

grandson, Marc R., age nine months. As assistant state's attorney
and later first assistant state's attorney of Cook County, Judge
Austin compiled an enviable record as one of the nation's greatest
prosecutors. He recently was Democratic candidate for governor
of Illinois and ,was defeated by the narrowest of margins.

The Speaker's Table: left to right, John A. Radcliffe, '57, President
of the Student Body, Richard Berryman, '57, Resident Head of Mead
House, Mr. Justice Brennan, Dean Bennett, '59, President of Mead

House, and
Review.

Terry Sandalow, '57,

a

Managing

Editor

oj the

Law

at

at 250

Cumberland Rd.,

471

Park Road,

Burlingame,
Burlingame. Paul is and

some
years professor oflaw at the University of Cali
fornia Hastings College of Law. Paul has two sons, Charles E.,
attending Stanford Medical School, and John P., attending Texas
A. and M. College. Professor Bayse has practiced in Missouri and
California and has been associated with the law schools of Michi
gan and Texas. His work as a legal draftsman and author has been
outstanding. He is the author of Clearing Land Titles and of vari
ous articles on real
property and probate law; former chairman
of the Model Probate Code Committee and present director of
the Real Property Division of Section of Real Property, Probate,
and Trust Law of the American Bar Association; co-draftsman of
the Model Probate Code for that Section and co-draftsman of the
Model Small Estates Act for Commissioners on Uniform State

Laws; and co-author, with Professor Lewis M. Simes, of Problems
in Probate Law, including a Model Probate Code.
BECKER, GEORGE W., resides at 418 S. j Sth Ave., Omaha,

Nebraska, where he has practiced since his admission

George

is married and

National Bank

practices under his

Building,
at

to

the Bar.

own name at 1212

First

Omaha.

BECKER, JACOB]', resides

California, and offices

and Indiana law journals.

service in the

Illinois labor law.

California, and offices

ARTERBURN, NORMAN F., resides at 1529 Old Orchard Rd., Vin
cennes, Indiana, and his office address is Supreme Court, State
House, Indianapolis. Norman is a justice of the Supreme Court of
Indiana and is a former member of the Board of Managers and
former president of the Indiana State Bar Association and also a

saw

army in World War I, has written authoritatively on administra
tive law and labor problems, and is a recognized authority on

U. of C., 1926, and they have three children: Mrs. Rosalie A. Gold

mittee from 1932

.

Law School

at

1I37 S.

1501

Thayer

Ave., Los

Grand Ave., Los

Angeles,
Angeles. Jacob

is professor of law at Loyola University School of Law in Los
Angeles. He is married, and there are no children. Professor Becker
was a

sergeant in world War I.

BWCHE, EMILE 0., resides at 803 N. Ridgeland, Oak Park,
Illinois, and his office address is lOll Lake St., Oak Park, where
he has been for many years a partner in the law firm of Willard &
Bloche, Emile is

president and chairman of the Board of the
daugh
ters, Florence Joan and Emilie Susan; a third daughter died recently
shortly after her graduation from college
a

past

West Suburban Bar Association. He is married and has two

.

The Bigelow Fellows for 1956-57: left to right, David B.
Horsley,
Oxford University; Richard L. Dewsnup University of Utah; Charles
M. Jacobs, University
of Chicago; John W. Davies, Oxford Univer
Stewart
sity;
Macaulay, Stanford University; Thomas E. Watts, Jr.,
Vanderbilt University; and Marc Galanter, University of Chicago.
,
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CARSE, BYRON A., resides at 18600

Fairway Dr., Detroit, Michi

gan, and his office address is 2306 Dime Building, Detroit. He prac
tices alone, is married, and has two daughters, Barbara and Sandra.

CLARK, FRANCIS 0., resides at 215 S. Walker, Clarendon Hills,
Illinois. Frank's other address is 41 I 5 Packers Ave., Chicago, where
he is house counsel in the Law Department of Swift and Com
pany. Frank has been village attorney of Clarendon Hills and is
well remembered for his football exploits. He became a "C" man
playing end for A. A. Stagg at Chicago. He is married and has two
daughters, Bernadine and Beulah. Bernadine is a student at South
ern Methodist
University.

CORNWALL, SIDNEY NEFF, resides
Lake

Utah. He is

City,

a

at 3325 S. Oakwood St., Salt
in
law firm of Van Cott, Bag
the
partner

Cornwall &

ley,

Lake

City.

McCarthy at 1311 Wallker Bank Building, Salt
He is married and has two daughters, Mrs. Jane C.

Laner and Barbara.
A luncheon

meeting o_(the Legal Ethics Seminar, held in the Law Lounge
in Judson Court. Students participate in a series
of such seminars
throughout their first year, under the supervision of Frederick B.
MacKinnon, Director of the American Bar Center's research activity
in

Legal Ethics.

Recovery Administration,

1934 and 1935; the Securities and Ex

change Commission, 1935-42; the Board of Economic Program
Coordination, 1942-46; the Department of Commerce, 1946-47,
where he was Associate Solicitor; the Foreign Service and Depart
of Defense, Office of the

Security

Resources

Secretary,

National
Reference

1947-51; the

Board, 1951-53; and the

Legislative

Service, 1953-56.
BOOTH, HARRY R., resides at 5715 Kimbark Ave., Chicago, and
offices at 30 N. La Salle St., where he specializes in public utility
litigation. Harry is married to Sylvia Whalley, Ph.B. 1937, and
has two daughters, Susan and Alice. Mr. Booth has held a number
of important federal and state positions. He was assistant attorney
general of Illinois from 1933 to 1940 and during 19-56 served as
special assistant state's attorney of Cook County, Illinois.
BRIODY, WALTER F., resides at 12119 Ann St., Blue Island, Illi
nois. His law office in the same suburb is-at 13104 S. Western Ave.
He is

a

master-in-chancery

married and has

at

536 E. 88th St.,

Chicago,

and for

N. La Salle St. Until 1946 he was
with the firm of Frisch and DeHaan and since that time he has

practiced

practiced

under his

at I

own name.

Abel is married, and there

are no

children.

BOLTON-SMITH, CARLILE, resides at 3007 "Q" St., N.W., Wash
ington, D.C., and is staff attorney .for the United States Senate
Judiciary Committee. He is married and has four children, Mrs.
Julia Patten, Carlile, Jr., and Ann and Robin, who are fifteen
year-old twin girls. Carlile, who is a graduate of Brookings In
stitute, helped in the formulation of the new codification of mili
tary departments. After leaving his association with Cravath Swain
and Moore in 1933, he has worked in government wherever major
problems presented themselves. Some of these posts were with the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration, 1933-34; the National

ment

DEHAAN, ABEL J., resides
many years has

a son

and

of the
a

city

court

DICKEY, DEAN R, resides at 7025 roth Ave., Seattle, Washing
and is retired. He is married and has one stepson. He was
secretary of the State Bar of California for five years and has prac
ton,

ticed in Illinois and California. He
tive

Counsel,

in California for

was

also chief deputy,

legisla

years. A 1918 graduate of the
Dean spent flve years in the regu

two

United States Military Academy,

lar army and was in the army of occupation in Germany following
World War 1. He was a lieutenant colonel of artillery in W orld
War II. Dean

spends

much time

at a

mountain

Forest, Oregon. The address is Camp Sherman,
forty miles northwest of Bend, Oregon.

retreat

in Pine

Oregon.

It is

DOSLAND, GOODWIN L., is the senior member of the firm of
Dosland and Dosland at Moorhead, Minnesota. The firm dates
back to 1886 and is the oldest in that part of the country. His office
address is Suite 209-210, American State Bank Building, Moor
head. He is married and has two sons. One son, W. B. Dosland, is
a
lawyer and a member of his firm. His second son,J. P. Dosland,
is

a

Senior

at

the

University of Minnesota

Law School. Goodwin

county attorney of. Clay County, Minnesota, for four years
and is a past president of the Clay County Bar Association. He has
been president of the American Radio Relay League and president
was

of Blue Island. He is

daughter.

BRODKEY, EDWARD, resides at 8022 Kenwood Ave., Chicago.
Loop address is 315 Plymouth Ct., where he is professor oflaw
at the John Marshall Law School. He is married and has two sons,
Dean G. and Hugh A. His son Hugh is a lawyer who took his J.D.
His

degree at The University of Chicago Law School in 1954. In cer
matters father and son practice together. There is a
grandchild,
jennifer, age two. Edward is the author of a casebook Illinois Cases
and Materials in Bailments Liens and Pledges. He is frequently before
the several United States circuit courts of appeal and the Supreme
Court of the United States in connection with trade-regulations
cases, in which he has specialized.
tain

J

Judson Dining
House, the

Hall in Burton-Judson Courts, where residents
Law School Residence, now take their meals.

new

of Mead
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of the International Amateur Radio Union. A commander in the
United States Naval Reserve, Goodwin is a veteran of both world
wars. He has
practiced law in Chicago and in Minnesota.
EGAN, CHARLES D., resides at 808 Monrovia St., Shreveport,
'Louisiana, and is a partner in' the firm of Cook, Clark, Egan,
Yancey and King, Commercial National Bank Building, Shreve
port. Charles is married and has a son, Leonard Egan, and a daugh
ter, Lucy Egan. He is a veteran of World War I.
GARVEY, HAROLD T., resides in Carthage, Illinois, and has his
law office in the Marine Trust Company Bank Building in that
city. Harold is married and has one son, Thomas Julian Garvey.
He is currently vice-president of the Hancock County Bar Associa
tion and was formerly judge of the County Court of Hancock
County and has served as a visiting probate judge in Cook Coun
ty, Illinois. He was principal attorney for the Railroad Retirement
Board in 1936, city attorney for Carthage from 1942 to 1949, and
assistant attorney-general of Illinois from 1949 to 1953.

GURVEY, HARRY E., resides at 6II4 N. Richmond St., Chicago,
and has his law offices at 221 N. La Salle St. He is married and has

children, Merna L. and Gary.
HANCOCK, LYNNDON M., resides at 205 W. Church St., Harris
burg, Illinois, and his law office is in the Rose Building at Harris
burg. Lynndon presently is judge of the City Court of Harrisburg
and was formerly county judge of Saline County, Illinois. Judge
Hancock is married and has three daughters, Mrs. Mary Alice

two

Garrison, Mrs. Martha Culley, and Mrs. Cynthia Guard. There
are three
grandchildren, Susan Lynn Guard, David Alan Culley,
and Lynndon Michael Guard.
HAREWOOD, RICHARD A., resides at 606 E. Oakwood Blvd.,
Chicago, and his law office is at 306 E. 43d St. He has been at vari
ous times a
representative in the Illinois General Assembly. He is
married, and there are no children. Richard is particularly proud
of the part he played in the case of Kane v. Johnson, 397 Ill. IJ2

(1947).

ISERMAN, THEODORE R., resides at 143 Willow St., Brooklyn,
York, and offices at 70 Broadway, New York, with the law
firm of Kelley, Drye, Newhall and Maginnes. Ted is married and
is a specialist in labor law (representing employers) and antitrust
matters. He is the author of Industrial Peace and the Wagner Act
New

To Make in

Tajt-Hartley

of the

LAw

Lounge

in Judson Court

(Digest Publishing Co., 1953); and Three Tajt-Hartley Issues
(American Enterprise Assoc., 1955). In addition, Ted helped draft
the Taft-Hartley Act and is the author of numerous articles on
labor law and labor relations. In his student days Ted was on the
sports staff of the Chicago Tribune, and "Ted Iserman" was a
familiar Chicago "by-line." Later he practiced for some years in
Paris, France.
of the Class of 1926 in the
Evanston, Illinois, and
practices at 10 S. La Salle St., Chicago. Craig is married, and there
are no children. He is a lieutenant in the United States Naval Re
serve and saw active
duty from 1942 to 1945.
KRAUSS, DANIEL T., resides at 603 E. Cecil St., Springfield,
Ohio. He is married and is a professor of business administration
at Wittenberg College, Springfield. Daniel has been an instructor
in business and finance at Wittenberg for thirty years, and three

JOHNSON,

HAYES, EARL H., resides at 6214 N. Magnolia St., Chicago, and
practices law at 64 W. Randolph St., where he is chief counsel for
R. C. Darley. Earl has never married.
HOMIRE, JAMES L., resides at 10 N. Kingshighway Blvd., St.
Louis, Missouri, and offices at 906 Olive St., St. Louis, where he
is vice-president and general counsel of the St. Louis-San Fran
cisco Railway Company. His children are Mrs. Nancy A. H. Cun
ningham, James L., Jr., and Cynthia K. His son is studying law at
Washington University Law School, St. Louis. There are two
grandsons, Andrew R. Cunningham and Richard C. Homire.
For many years James reviewed the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States for the American'Bar Association Journal.
HORRELL, ALBERT]., resides at II73 Cherry St., Winnetka, Illi
nois, and offices at 100 N. La Salle St., Chicago. Albert is mar
ried and had four children, Michael E., Ruth Irene, Judith Ann,
and Diana T. He is an instructor in the Illinois law of eminent do
main in the Graduate School ofjohn Marshall Law School. He is
the author of the textbook used in the course. Albert was general
counsel for the State of Illinois Medical Center Commission from
1946 to 1953 and was assistant state's attorney in charge of the
Cook County State's Attorney's office from 1953 to 1956.

(McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1947); Changes

A view

Law

CRAIG R., the

School, resides

at

president

1608 Hinman

Ave.,

of his former students are presently attending The University of
Chicago Law School. Daniel is a veteran of World War I.
LITTLE, MERRITT ]., resides at 2270 S. Elmwood Dr., Aurora,
Illinois. He is the senior partner in the Aurora law firm of. Little,

Prebrey and Ohse, with offices at 507 Aurora National Bank
Building, Aurora. Merritt is married and has two sons, George
Michael and John Merritt. He was master-in-chancery of the Cir
cuit Court of Kane
tion counsel of the
senator

from 1944,

County, Illinois, from 1936 to 1945; corpora
city of Aurora from 1931 to 1937; and state
having been re-elected for four years in 1956�

past president of the Aurora Bar Association and also of the
Sixth Supreme Court District Bar Association. For fourteen years
he has been the chairman of the Kane County, Illinois, Republican
Central Committee.
LITTLE, ROLAND EARL, resides at 331 S. York Rd., Elmhurst,
Illinois. Earl practices law at 139 N. Clark St., Chicago. He is mar
ried and has two daughters, Mrs. Lou Alice Soukup and Maudie,
and a grandson, Scott Philip Soukup. He was in the army in
World War I.
He is

a
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MARCHELLO, MAURICE R., resides at II334 Forestville Ave.,
His office is at r r S. La Salle St. Maurice has been a wid
ower for
many years and is the father of Lieutenant Maurice N., a
graduate of Purdue in engineering and an Air Force commander,
and Marcia M., a student at the University of Illinois. He has a

Chicago.

grandson,

Maurice M.

Marchello,

age

two.

Maurice

was

personal

attorney to Edward J. Barrett during his terms as state treasurer
and state auditor and is a former vice-president of the Justinian So
ciety of Advocates.
MAREMONT, ARNOLD H., resides at 614 Pine Lane, Winnetka,
Illinois, and is president of Maremont Automotive Products, Inc.,
with offices at 1600 S. Ashland Ave., and chairman of the Board
of Allied Paper Corporation. Arnold is married and has two chil
dren, Madelon and Nicholas Michael. He is a member of the
Citizens' Advisory Board of the University of Chicago, a trustee
of Roosevelt University and of the Community Music Center of
North Shore, is on the Finance Committee of the Ravinia Festival
Association, and is a governing life-member of the Art Institute
of Chicago.
McLEAN, HAROLD H., resides at 192 Mayfair Dr., Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, and his office address is 318 Pittsburgh and Lake
Erie Terminal Building, Pittsburgh. He is vice-president and gen
eral counsel of the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Company.
Harold has been in the law department of the New York Central
System since January I, 1927, and was general counsel of the New
York Central Railroad Company from April, 1952, to March I,
1956. The Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad Company is a con
trolled subsidiary of the New York Central. He is married to
Sarah M. Newton McLean (Ph.B., University of Chicago, 1925),
and they have three sons, Arthur, James, and Hugh.
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MECHEM, PHILIP, resides at 381 Penn Rd., Wynnewood, Penn
sylvania, and his office is at the University of Pennsylvania Law

School, Philadelphia. Philip

of the Associa
taught in the
law schools of Washington University, the University of Kansas,
the University of Iowa, and the University of Idaho. Professor
Mechem is married and his son, Charles E. Mechem, graduated
from the University of Pennsylvania Law School and is in the
legal department of the Pennsylvania Railroad. He has a grandson,
Floyd Russell Mechem II, age one year.
MOHRDIECK, RALPH F., resides at 5955 N. Newark Ave., Chi
cago, and is a title officer with the Chicago Title and Trust Com
is

currently president

tion of American Law Schools and heretofore has

panyat

III

Joan, and

a

W.
son,

Washington St.

He is married and has

a

daughter,

William.

OBERNDORF, HOWARD M., resides at 16 Dunlap Rd., Park For
Illinois, and his office is at 30 Plaza, Park Forest, where he is
general counsel for American Community Builders, Inc. He was
formerly assistant regional agency counsel for the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation at the Chicago Loan Agency. He is married,
and there are no children.
PERLMAN, SAMUEL B., resides at 3528 C Pine Grove Ave., Chi
cago, and is in the private practice of law. He is married and has
two sons, James and Robert. He was a senior
attorney in the
United States Department of Labor from 1939 to 1945 and was
chief district counsel, Office of Price Stabilization, 1951-53.
PROCTOR, RICHARD WILLIS, resides at Kirkland, Illinois, and is
a title examiner with the DeKalb Abstract
Company at 108 N.
Main St., Sycamore, Illinois. Willis was with Loucks Eckert and
Peterson from 1928 to 1944 and with the United States Depart
ment of Labor Solicitor's Office from 1944 to 1952. From 1953 to
est,

meeting of the National Honor Scholars who are members of the entering class. The undergraduate colleges represented are the University of
Alabama, Albion, Antioch, Bates, Beloit, Bowdoin, Brigham Young, Carleton, Colgate, Cornell College, Davidson, DePauw, Emery, Pepperdine,
Grinnell, Hamilton, Harvard, Haverford, University of Kansas, Maine, Maryville, Millikin, Nebraska, North Carolina, Reed, Ripon, St. Olaf,
Syracuse, Southern Methodist, Tufts, Whitman, Wittenberg, Yale.
A
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Chapter of the American Association of University
president of the Chicago Regional Chap
ter of the
College English Association, 1954-55. He was formerly
on the
faculty of Washington State College.
Northwestern

1954-55, and

Professors,

SCHAEFER, ELMER P., resides

Illinois, and his office is

at

at

30 N. La

184 Lawndale Ave., Elmhurst,
Salle St., Chicago, where he is

regional counsel for a federal agency, the
gage Association. From 1927

law at

ness

Loyola University

to 1942

in

he

Federal National Mort

was an

instructor in busi

Chicago and during the same pe

associated with Tolman, Sexton and Chandler and its
successor
Chicago law firms. Since 1942 he has been a lawyer in
the federal service. Elmer is married and has twin sons and a daugh

riod

ter,

was

all of whom

plan to

attend The

University of Chicago

Law

School.

The Kosmerl Scholars: Alan Washburn, Rapid City, South Dakota;
A.B., Shimer College; Charles Lewis, Dayton, Ohio; A.B., Del'auw

University.

Leslie Ann Proctor.
ROLLINS, HERMAND., resides
ton, West

at 1409 Sweetbriar Rd., Charles
Virginia, and is a partner in the firm ofLetz and Rollins,

Davidson

Building, Charleston.

Jeanne,

and

a son

He is married and has

Herman Dennis,

Jr.,

a

daughter,

who is sixteen and

plans to study law at The University of Chicago Law School. He
is a veteran of World War I. His law work is chiefly trial and ap
pellate.
ROSENBAUM, JOSEPH, resides at 1338 Fargo Ave., Chicago, and
practices law at 29 S. La Salle St., as a partner in the firm of Ruskin
and Rosenbaum. He has

two

children,

Mrs. Erwin Cohen and

RUPPELT, ERNEST WILLIAMS, resides at II08 G. Ave., Grundy
Center, Iowa, and is a member ofthe firm ofRuppelt and Kimball
at 606! 8th St., Grundy Center. Ernest has been president of the
Grundy County Bar Association and ofthe Bar Association of the
District of Iowa. He has been county attorney of
Tenth

Judicial
Grundy County.

He served in both world wars. In World War II
he was a major in the Asiatic Pacific Theater. He is married and
has two daughters, Mrs. Jean Marie Evans and Mrs. Judith Ann
Fernow.

SAMMONS, GEORGE F., resides

at

Kentland, Indiana, and prac

George M. Sammons, under the firm name
and
Sammons.
Sammons
of
George is married and has two other
sons, James E. and William F. George was judge of the Newton
tices law with his son,

Circuit Court from 1931

to 1941.

He

was

in

military

service in

World War I.

SAMUELS, ERNEST F., resides at 3II6 Park Pl., Evanston, Illinois,
and is professor of English at Northwestern University, Evanston.
He is married and has three children, Susanna,Jonathan, and Eliza
beth. His legal practice is confined to consultation with his

brothers,

SHANBERG, MAURICE G., resides at 1755 E. 55th St., Chicago,
and his office is at 10 S. La Salle St., where he has for many years
been a partner in the law firm of Marshall and Marshall. Maurice
two daughters, Jean and Alice.
STIEFEL, CHARLES W.,JR., resides at 7321 South Shore Dr., Chi
firm of Stiefel, Green
cago, and is the senior partner in the law
is
married
and has a daughter,
Charles
Burns
&
Baldridge.
berg,
and
a son, John C., who may attend The University of
Cynthia,
Chicago Law School. He was an assistant city attorney.

is married and has

SULLIVAN, PIKE H., resides at 222 E. Chestnut St., Chicago. His
Michigan Ave., where he practices law as manager
of the Development and Patent Department of the Standard Oil
office is at 910 S.

Company of Indiana. Pike specializes in patent matters and is
presently a member of the Board of Managers of the Patent Law
Association of Chicago. He is married and has three children,
Pike

H.,Jr., Gary B., and Marie E. Pike H. Sullivan III, two years

of age, is

Henry Joseph.

Leo S. and Arthur S., who

are

lawyers,

and

to

consulta

legal literary expert. He was awarded the Guggenheim
Fellowship in literature in 1955-56 and is the author of The Young

tions

dent of the Illinois Construction Corporation, building schools,
factories, apartments, and homes. He is married, and there are no

children.

the present he has been with the DeKalb Abstract Company. He
is married and has a son, John, and a daughter, Ann. His son at
tended the University of Chicago, and his daughter is a Sopho
more at the University of Wisconsin. He has a granddaughter,

Lois

SCHWEITZER, RICHARD H., resides at 5600 Blackstone Ave., Chi
cago, and his office is at 5608 Blackstone Ave. Richard practices
under his own name and for the last ten years has also been presi

as a

Henry Adams (Harvard University Press 1948) and Business Eng
lish Projects (Prentice-Hall, 1936-40). He was president of the

a

grandson.

TASHER, Lucy LUCILE, resides at 202 W. Ash St., Normal, Illi
nois. She is a professor of social science at Illinois State Normal
University. Lucile practiced in both Indiana and California and
joined the faculty of Illinois State Normal University in 1935.
THORWALDSON, A. S., resides at 292 Claremont St., Elmhurst,
Illinois, and offices at 38 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, where he is as
sistant vice-president of the First National Bank of Chicago. He is
married and has

two

children and four

grandchildren.

TINSLEY, WALTER E., resides at 880 Private Rd., Winnetka,
Illinois. He is a partner in the Chicago law firm of Kirkland, Flem
ing, Green, Martin and Ellis. Walter entered this firm immediately
upon leaving law school. He is married and has one daughter,
Mrs. Jeanne

Tapp,

and

a

granddaughter,

Karin

Tapp.

TOFT, GAYLORD A., resides at Fair Oaks Rd., West Chicago,
Illinois, and practices law at 231 S. La Salle St., Chicago, where he
is senior partner in the law firm ofToft, Fitzsimons and Living
ston. He is married and has four sons, ages seven, six, three,
and

one.

TOOMIN, PHILIP R., resides at 970 Bluff St., Glencoe, Illinois,
and practices law at 120 S. La Salle St., Chicago. He is married and
has two children, Marcia Jane and Michael.
WEISBROD, MARTIN 0., resides at 3121 N. Sheridan Rd., Chi
there are
cago, and offices at 221 N. La Salle St. He is married, and
no

children.
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The

by

Monopoly

a

as

Viewed

By

EDWARD H. LEVI

Professor oj Law, University oj Chicago

Talk Given

before

a

Section

of

Law School

the American Economic

Association, December 28, 1956.
A

suggestion for the application oflaw

to

the solution of a

social

problem always raises at least three questions. These
are:
(I) How serious is the need for some correction of the
social problem? (2) How great will be the loss offreedom
as the inevitable result of the
application of the coercive
power of Jaw? (3) What are the foreseeable consequences,
intended or unintended, of the legal means of the remedy
which are proposed? In a sense all these questions-and they
could be elaborated into many more-are but parts of one
inquiry into whether the legal cure is not worse than the
social disease. And it is, of course, natural that people will
differ in their judgment as to their prediction of results. It
is perhaps worthwhile reminding ourselves of these obvi
ous
questions, for they emphasize that the separate disci
plines of the social sciences may not be able by themselves,
and in isolation, to determine whether law ought or ought
not be applied in a particular way. In this connection we
should remind ourselves that law is
some of the subtleties of theoretical
the law's
are
or

a

blunt instrument, and
be beyond

analysis may

practical performance.

addition,
concerned,

In

so

far

as

the subtleties of theoretical analysis
be aware that, when the intended

we must

unintended consequences of law's application are con
For
are numerous and complicated.

sidered, the factors

many reasons prediction is not easy. Inevitably, a decisive
role is likely to be played by the basic presumption with

which

we

approach suggestions

for the

application

of law.

The basic presumption, or the alacrity with which sugges
tions for more law are accepted, will determine which side
has the burden of persuasion.

presumption concerning the
to be
role
oflaw
be
said
closely related to the
proper
may
of
is
which
the
antitrust,
history
history of the use oflaw in
That
a
is
particular way.
history not simple, and it includes
diverse
and
sometimes
many
contradictory ideas and
The choice of the basic

movements.

It is

perhaps

an

oversimplification

to

suggest
use of
law and in favor of freedom from law in the pursuit of
trade. To be sure, the origins of antitrust reflect an opposi
tion to the exercise of power by the government in inter
ference with freedom of trade. The opposed governmental
power manifested itself either in monopoly grants or in the
misuse of grants by semigovernmental or semiprivate
gropps. But the underlying theory of antitrust is sometimes
summarized not so much as an opposition to interference
by the government through law with the freedom of trade
but rather as directed against the usurpation of governmenthat antitrust itself reflects

tal power

by private groups. Monopoly in its various forms
private hands was thought to be such a usurpation. So
the underlying presumption of antitrust might be thought
to be not so much
against governmental power or interfer
ing laws but rather as against that private power which
in

Lawyer

Dean and

A

Problem
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a

presumption against the

when it reaches monopoly strength has the effect oflaw. A
persistent theme in antitrust enforcement, however, has
been to create a code of fair competition or at least to give
relief to, or erect safeguards for, private parties who are
considered injured by unfair tactics. And in this sense an
underlying presumption of antitrust might be thought to
be in favor of the use of law to interfere with trade if the
result is increased fairness. So antitrust might be regarded,
then, as but another instrument of law for governmental
planning for, and interference with, the competitive
economy.

the

complexities of the history of
which it has been put, there proba
bly is agreement that the antitrust laws are supposed to be
characterized as distinctive because they do not represent
government planning Jor the economy. In this sense they
are
supposed to be non-regulatory. They are supposed to
be based on freedom from law, both the private variety and
the public, for a competitive economy. And such interfer
ence as the law
inevitably brings is justified as the minimum
interference or regulation made necessary because of the
existence otherwise of monopoly. And possibly therefore
we can
say, that the antitrust laws basically reflect a pre
sumption that the burden of persuasion must be placed on
the side of those who urge the application oflaw to a social
problem. As I have suggested, it could be urged that this
statement of the presumption reflected in antitrust is too
far-reaching and that, indeed, all we know is that the anti
trust laws are against some forms of
private power on the
somewhat dubious basis that private power is less good than
public. But we must recall that the antitrust laws are not
Yet

acknowledging

antitrust, and the

against private
least until
power,
ference

uses to

power in its

nor,

as

has

so

numerous

manifestations. At

not even against economic
often been said, do they justify inter

recently they

were

compel all competition that is possible. For the
most part
they are directed solely against monopoly and
those restraints oftrade which in antitrust history have come
to be
thought inextricably interwoven with monopoly.
to

Thus the

use

of law and the role of government are" nar
and this is supposed to be the distinctive

rowly confined,

feature of antitrust.
In large measure this limited conception of the role' of
law as reflected in the antitrust laws was the reason that the
revival of antitrust enforcement in the Robert Jackson and
Thurman Arnold period was greeted with scepticism.
Monopoly then was popularly regarded as a significant
cause for
unemployment and depression. The solution of
the monopoly problem was regarded as particularly diffi
cult because of the assumption, held by many, that new
conditions of economic life required firms to reach monop
oly size. A widely held view was that any attempt to deal

The
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problem through antitrust would be an ineffective
effort to turn back the clock. In the wake of the demise of
the NRA many thought some new form of economic plan
ning and control would have to be devised. Symbolically,
antitrust enforcement, which gained formulation and mo
mentum under Arnold, represented the alternative to plan
ning and control. Antitrust came to portray the federal
with this

enterprise, and this was a free
government's
dom from administrative regulation as well as from monop
oly enterprise. To be sure, it was suggested that the new
consent decrees were to become charters for industry and
thus a constructive formulation of administrative rules for
industry. But this promise was unfulfilled. Rather through
many devices, in retrospect some good and some bad, the
antitrust ideal was revived. The antitrust laws, at least in the
abstract, became popular. The effect was to be seen not
only in enforcement policy but in the substantive content
of the laws themselves. As a result, in every subdivision of
interest in free

the laws, whether

dealing

with patents,

price-fixing

agree

division of

territory arrangements, or
size
as
monopolizing, there was an expansion of
monopoly
labor area was the one exception.
The
legal concepts.
If the application of law to a social problem raises the
question of whether the cure is worse than the disease, then
ments,

conspiracies,

problem has to be faced in terms of the situation as it
at
particular time. While there is a great deal of con
of
talk between the Arnold period and the present,
tinuity

the

exists

there

a

are numerous

Law School

University of Chicago

differences between the total situation

it is found today and the prior period. The connection
between the monopoly problem and business cycle, de
pression, and unemployment no longer seems as decisive as
it then did to many; indeed, the connection seems remote

as

11

question, of course, is whether
this economic power means monopoly. So far as the law is
concerned, firms of monopoly size which operate without
with distributors. An initial

economic

sionary

justification or, more certainly, engage in exclu
are
guilty of monopolizing and can be dealt

tactics

with under the antitrust laws. Are these the firms which

thought to have undue economic power, or does that
concept refer to firms beyond the scope of the present law's
reach? If the latter is the case, is this because the law's defi
nition of monopoly or monopolizing is out of step with
are

the economic definition and is wrong? Or is economic
power something beyond and above monopoly or monop
olizing for economics as well as for law? These seem to be
basic issues when the law approaches what is often de
scribed
It

as

must

the present monopoly problem.
be admitted at once that the law in action

flects

uncertainty

case.

But

re

what

illegal monopoly or monop
olizing is. The law has sometimes appeared to incorporate
the idea that illegal monopoly or monopolizing exists, at
least when there is no justification, when a single firm
through control of its own output can change the market
price. The firm is then said to be engaged in a kind of price
fixing certainly as effective as illegal price-fixing arrange
.ments between competitors dominant in an industry. This
indeed might be thought to be the doctrine of the Alcoa
as

to

Alcoa, under the computation used, controlled

of the output. The opinion states that such a
percentage is enough to constitute a monopoly and goes on
to
say that it is doubtful whether 60 or 64 per cent would
90

per

cent

enough. Yet producer of that lesser amount and con
siderably smaller amounts would be able to change the
price by curtailing his own production. His control would
be

a

except for the possible accentuating effect of rigid prices.
Perhaps therefore there is less of a felt need to do anything.
about the monopoly problem. Moreover, reflective studies
do not show any recent significant increase in concentra
tion; indeed, they do not show any significant increase
since 1904. The sense of urgency previously present either
has or should have disappeared. Further, if the greatest con
tribution of the Arnold period was the symbolization of the

Continued on

page 26

government's interest in free enterprise as opposed to con
through regulation, perhaps in the present setting this
is no longer so much required. Moreover, it is no longer so
clear what symbolic meaning is to be attributed to anti

trol

trust

enforcement.

Probably what is regarded as the continuing monopoly
problem today is the existence of economic power in firms
of large size. Many of these firms are in industries where a
relatively few firms have a major portion of the output.
Thus oligopoly is thought to require special attention. And
because the problem of economic power through size is
hard to handle directly, in that economic power is hard to
evaluate and that the allowable limits are not easy to deter
mine, much attention has been centered on the causes and
effects of this power, as, for example,
price dis

Judge Sterry

crimination, exclusive arrangements, and unfair

Second Circuit.

mergers,

dealing

Roger

JD '54, is law clerk
Supreme Court: Last year

C. Cramton,

United States

Waterman

of the

to

Mr.

Justice

Mr. Cramton

United States Court

Burton
was

of the

clerk

of Appeals for

to

the
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Conference
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Judicial
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Administration

In November The Law School

sponsored a Conference on
Administration
as a
Judicial
part of its regular Conference
Series. The opening session of the Conference, which was
chaired by Assistant Dean Lucas, was concerned with "The
Administration of Court Systems." Speakers were Henry P.
Chandler, director 'of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, who discussed "Problems in Admin
istration of Courts of the United States," and Edward B.
McConnell, administrative director of the courts of New
Jersey, who described "The Administrative Office of a
State Court System." Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., presided
the luncheon session, which featured an address by
JudgeJames B. M. McNally of the Supreme Court of New
York on ''Judicial Administration and the Trial Judge" and
over

comment

Roemer,

Judge McNally's speech by Erwin W.
of Gardner, Carton, Douglas, Roemer and Chil
on

Professor Karl Llewellyn with Hon. Charles E. Clark,Judge ofthe U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Judge Clark spoke at
the Conference on Judicial Administration.

gren.

The

subject of the afternoon session, over which Professor
presided, was "Problems of Judicial Ad
ministration." Speakers were Judge Harry M. Fisher of the
Allison Dunham

Circuit Court of Cook County, who talked on "Problems
of Metropolitan State Courts," and Judge Alexander Holt
zoff of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, who discussed "Problems in the Federal Sys
tem."
Professor Philip B. Kurland chaired the dinner session,
the topic of which was "The Role of Appellate Courts in
Judicial Administration." Judge Roger J. Traynor of the
Supreme Court of California discussed "A State Supreme

Court," while Judge Charles

E. Clark of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

analyzed the prob
lems of "The United States Court of Appeals." Judge Ed
win A. Robson of the Appellate Court of Illinois acted as
commentator on

the

two

preceding

papers.

At the Conference on Judicial Administration: Hon. Edwin A. Robson,
ofthe Appellate Court of Illinois, who spoke at the Dinner Session, with
Mr. and Mrs. Henry P. Chandler. Mr. Chandler, Director of the Ad
ministrative
Office of the United Stales Courts, spoke at the Morning
Session.

Hon.

Circuit Court of Cook County, ad
in Law North.
Administration
Judicial

Harry Fisher, Judge of the

dresses the

Conference

on

At the reception preceding the Dinner Session of the Conference on
Judicial Administration: Professor Francis Allen; Hon. James B. M.
McNally, of the Supreme Court of New York, who spoke at the
Luncheon Session; Hon. Walter V. Schaefer, JD '28, Supreme Court
of Illinois; and Professor Philip B. Kurland.

The
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now
residing in California, with Professor Sheldon
Tefft at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles. Professor Tefft spoke at
an alumni luncheon held
dllring the Annual Meeting of the State Bar
of California.

Law School Alumni

�r Gardner) Carton, Douglas, Roemer and Chilgren,
discussion with students following Mr. Roemer's participa

Erwin W. Roemer,
at

right,

in

tion in the

a

Conference on Jlldicial Administration.

Alumni Notes
The School notes with regret the recent passing of MITCHELL
DAWSON, JD'13, ALBERT S. LONG, JR., JD'47, and MAX
Mr. Dawson had practiced law in Chicago
than forty years, carrying on the office established
by his father. In addition to being an eminent member of
the bar, he was for many years active in the affairs of the
City Club of Chicago and of the Chicago, the Illinois, and
the American Bar Associations. He was well known as a
highly successful general writer, with much of his work
published in magazines of general circulation, and was as
well the author of a well-known book for children.
Mr. Long, after several years of practice, both private

DERRY,
for

A

special library

Springfield,

exhibit is shou«

to

George. Hoffmann, JD '28, of

Illinois.

JD'49.

more

and institutional, had become, shortly before his death, gen
eral solicitor and secretary of the Chicago, Indianapolis and
Louisville Railway Company, generally known as the
Monon Line.

Mr. Derry, upon graduation, joined the staff of the
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company and somewhat
later became associated with the Harris Trust and Savings

Bank. In 1953 he became associated in practice with
ALLIN H. PIERCE, JD'23. After Mr. Pierce became a judge
of the United States Tax Court, Mr. Derry continued in
individual practice. He served on several committees of the
Chicago Bar Association and was an active member of The
Law School Alumni Association.

JD'30, acted as one of the leading figures
celebration of the Bernard Shaw Centennial.
acting as chairman of exhibits and displays, he

ELMER GERTZ,
in the

recent

As well

as

in two programs on WTTW, in the WIND
"Forum of the Air," and in a nationally broadcast program
of the "Northwestern Reviewing Stand." A recent issue of

participated

of the writings of Professor Sheldon Tefft, ;vhich is typical
of a series ofspecial collections of Facutty work.

A collection
in form

Chicago magazine featured an article by Mr. Gertz on the
political career of Colonel Jacob Arvey.
The Record is pleased to report that JEROME S. WEISS,
JD' 30, is currently serving as second vice-president of the
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Chicago

Bar Association and that HUBERT 1.
WILL, JD'37,
librarian. Moreover, LEE C. SHAW,
acting
JD'38, and
ALLEN D.
are members of the
is

as

Managers.

HOLLOWAY,JD'25,

Board of

GEORGE

JOSEPH, JD' 54, has joined the faculty of Ohio
University.
JACK E. FRANKEL, JD' 50, is assistant secretary of the State

Northern

Bar of California, with offices in San
Francisco. Mr.

Frankel
California field
representative of the National Legal Aid
Association as well as chairman of the East
Bay Committee
on Student Enrolment for the
of
is

University

ABA Annual

Chicago.

Meeting

Three members of The Law School
Faculty participated in
activities in connection with the annual
meeting of the
American Bar Association in Dallas last
August.
Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., discussed the School's

Jury

meeting of the Junior Bar Conference.
Professor Nicholas Katzenbach, who
recently joined the
Law Faculty after
teaching at Yale, and Assistant Dean
James Ratcliffe were Faculty hosts at a cocktail party held

Project

at a

for all alumni of the School
About fifty alumni and wives

during

the annual

in

attendance.

were

meeting.
Professor Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, formerly of the Yale Law
School faculty, who
recently joined the Law FacilIty at the University
of Chicago.

l

An oil

portrait of the late George Maurice Morris, JD '15, which now
Members Lounge of the American Bar Center.
Mr. Morris
served as President
of the American Bar Association and took a leading

hangs

part

in

'J

in the

the creation

of the

Bar Center.

Professor Francis A. Allen,formerly of the Harvard Law
Schoolfawlty,
member of the Faculty
of The University of Chicago Law School.

a new
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The

Federal Tax
In

University of Chicago

Conference

"Business Purchase

sponsored the Ninth Annual Federal
Conference. A three-day meeting, the Conference at
tracted an audience of more than four hundred,
composed

accountants, and corporate officials from all
over the United States.
a com
Again this year, the Conference was
mittee

planned by
composed of Chicago lawyers and accountants, with

Compensa

tion": LESLIE MILLS, Price, Waterhouse and
Company, New
York
"Some Subchapter C Trouble
Spots-after Two Years": GEORGE
STINSON, Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly and Hamilton, New York
"United States Income Taxes on
Foreign Business Income":
ROBERT W. WALES, Standard-Vacuum Oil
Company, White

Professor Walter Blum and Assistant Dean
James M. Rat
The
Law
School.
Members
of the Com
representing
mittee were as follows:
cliffe

WILLIAM N. HADDAD,
WALTER

Chairman, Bell, Boyd, Marshall and Lloyd
J. BLUM, Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law

Plains,

School

FREDERICK O. DICUS,

Chapman and Cutler, Chicago
McDermott, Will and Emery, Chicago
JAMES D. HEAD, Winston, Strawn, Smith and Patterson
PAUL F. JOHNSON, Ernst and Ernst,
Chicago
ROBERT R. JORGENSEN, Sears, Roebuck and
Company, Chicago
WILLIAM A. MCSWAIN, Eckart, Klein, McSwain and
Campbell,

Presiding Judge:

THE HONORABLE ALLIN H. PIERCE,
Judge of the
Tax Court of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
and Ballard,
Taxpayer Counsel: FRANCIS H. URIELL,

Chicago
M.

RATCLIFFE, Assistant Dean,

School
FREDERICK R. SHEARER,

and Platt,

University

of

Chicago

Mayer, Friedlich, Spiess, Tierney,

Law

Pope

MICHAEL J. SPORRER, Arthur Andersen and

Hopkins,

Chicago

Governmental Counsel: ABRAHAM J. FRIEDMAN, Assistant
Regional
Counsel, United States Internal Revenue Service, Detroit

Brown

Chicago

HARRY B. SUTTER,

N.Y.

Panel Discussion of Mr. Wales's
Paper: DWIGHT HIGHTOWER,
Baker, McKenzie and Hightower, Chicago; ROBERT R.
JORGEN
SEN, Sears, Roebuck and
Company, Chicago; FREDERICK R.
SHEARER, Mayer, Friedlich, Spiess, Tierney, Brown and Platt
"The Penalty Surtax on Unreasonable
Corporate Accumulations:
A Mock Trial"

WILLIAM M. EMERY,

JAMES

Agreements":

A Round-Table Discussion:
Moderator, Sonnenschein, Berkson, Laut
mann, Levinson and Morse ; WALTER
J. BLUM, Professor of
Law, University of Chicago Law School; MAX E.
MEYER,
Lord, Bissell and Brook, Chicago; MICHAEL J. SPORRER, Arthur
Andersen and Company,
Chicago; HUBERT L. WILL, Nelson,
Boodell and Will, Chicago
"Recent Developments in the Taxation of Executive

October the School

lawyers,

15

LEONARD M. RIESER,

Tax

of

Law School

Company, Chicago
Mulroy and Wentz,

Sutter, Owen,

Chicago
The program of the Conference was as follows:
"Address of Welcome": GLEN A. LLOYD, Chairman, Board of
Trustees, University of Chicago
"Maintaining an Effective Internal Revenue Service": HON. Rus
SELL C. HARRINGTON, United States Commissioner of
Internal
Revenue, Washington, D.C.
"Current Issues in the Use of Tax-exempt
NOR
MAN

A.

Organizations":

SUGARMAN, Baker, Hostetler and Patterson, Cleveland

Panel Discussion of Mr.
Sugarman's Paper: PAUL F. JOHNSON,
Ernst and Ernst,
Chicago; MIDDLETON MILLER, Sidley, Austin,
Burgess and Smith, Chicago; HARRY N. WYATT, D'Ancona,
Pflaum, Wyatt and Riskind, Chicago
"Troublesome Will Provisions": WILLIAM K. STEVENS, The First
National Bank of Chicago, Chicago
"Some Highlights of Recent Tax
Regulations Affecting Trusts and
Estates": JAMES P. JOHNSON, Bell,
Marshall and

Boyd,

Lloyd,

Chicago
Panel Discussion of Stevens' and
DICUS, Chapman and Cutler,
Northern Trust Company,

Johnson's Paper: FREDERICK O.
Chicago; AUSTIN FLEMING, The
Chicago; ROLAND K. SMITH,
Beale, Chicago

Isham, Lincoln and
"Tax Consequences of Thin
Incorporations": BORIS
Professor of Law, Yale Law School
"Tax Advantages and Pitfalls in
Collapsible

Partnerships,": IRVING
Knupp, Los Angeles

I.

I.

BITTKER,

Corporations
Silberberg

AXELRAD, Mitchell,

and

and

Panel Discussion of Bittker's and Axelrad's
Papers: CHARLES W.
DAVIS, Hopkins, Sutter, Owen, Mulroy and Wentz. Chicago;
WILLIAM M. EMERY, McDermott, w.n and
Emery, Chicago;
ROBERT F. GRAHAM, Gardner, Carton,
Douglas, Roemer and

Chilgren, Chicago

I

Ronald Tonidandel, winner of the
Joseph Henry Beale Prize, awarded
annually to the first-year student whose work in the .first-year tutorial
program is judged most worthy of special recognition. Mr. Tonidandel is
from Stafford Springs, Connecticut, and received the A.B. degree from
Amherst College.
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Railway

1

Union and had been since its

organization, June

On the second ofJuly, I894,
was

a

20,

I893.

complaint or bill in equity

filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the
against Debs and his associates,

Northern District of Illinois

praying that the defendants be "enjoined touching a certain
conspiracy in said complaint or bin in equity alleged."
The bill

was

founded

on

the antitrust law ofJuly

2,

I890,

the Sherman Act.
It referred to the fact that in

May, I894, a dispute arose
between the Pullman Palace Car Company and its em
ployees and that, as a result, the employees or a "consider
able portion of them" left the service of the company. It
then proceeded to charge that the defendants and other
members of their union combined together and with others
unknown and announced that for the purpose of compell
ing an adjustment between the Pullman Company and its
employees the American Railway Union would create a
boycott against Pullman cars and that, by direction, man y
of its members would seek to make the boycott effective by
leaving the employ of some twenty-one named railroads

maintaining I20,000 miles of track; that the defendants en
tered into this conspiracy with the intent and for the pur
pose of preventing the railroads from performing their
state

carriers and

injure and obstruct inter
carriage of freight and passengers and the carrying of

duties

as common

to

the mails; that they issued strike orders pursuant to their
unlawful conspiracy and by threats, intimidation, force, and
violence prevented the railroads from retaining employees

and stopped, obstructed, derailed, and
wrecked engines and trains, and thus curtailed necessary
supplies of fuel and food; and that, with other parties un
known, they threatened and announced that they would tie
up and paralyze, if necessary, the operations of every rail
road in the United States and the business and industries
dependent thereon.
That was the sum and substance of the charges, omitting,
of course, a vast amount of detail. The injunction prayed
was issued without notice to Debs and the other defendants.
It was served and published.
On July I7, I894, the government filed an information
charging the defendants with violation of the injunction
and praying that a rule be entered against them, requiring
them to show cause why they should not be attached for
contempt. They appeared and answered, denying all mat
ters of substance in the information. They admitted the or
ganization of local unions but denied any pow�r in them
selves or any intent to secure the power to order the institu
tion or cessation of strikes. They denied that they ordered
the employees of the railroads in question to strike but al
leged that the members of their union, without orders, but
of their own free will, by a vote of a majority of them in a
regular meeting, decided to strike and, pursuant to that
vote, "freely and voluntarily of their own accord, without
or

hiring

order, direction or control

on the
part of said American
Union, its officers or directors," or of the defend
ants or any of them, did strike.
They denied any part in the
violence that admittedly resulted and alleged that they al
ways counseled and advised their members with whom
they were in communication "to at all times abstain from
violence, threats, and intimidation, and to at all times re
spect the law and the officers thereof"
Motions to dismiss the information had been heard and

any

Continued from page
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new men

denied

by Judges Woods and Grosscup.
The charges and answers were heard by Judge Woods,
and on December I4, I894, he adjudged the defendants in
contempt and sentenced them to jail-Debs for six months,
the others for three. The sentences were to commence ten

days after the order. But, on December 24, sentences were
suspended until January 8, I895, at which time the defend
ants were committed to the jail in Woodstock,
McHenry
County, because the Cook County jail was overcrowded.
On July 4, I894, Debs had addressed the following to
the public:
The business of the country has been demoralized to an ex
exaggeration. To say that the situation is alarming

...

tent

is

that defies

entirely

citizen

within the bounds of prudent statements. Every good
view the outlook with grave concern. Something

must

should, something must be done. The American people are peace
loving people; they want neither anarchy nor revolution. They
have faith in their institutions; they believe in law and order; they
believe in good government; but they also believe in fair play.
The

boycott

of Pullman

cars

and

ensuing

strikes had be

gun on June 26, I894, and on June 29 Debs had written a
letter to the Railway Employees of America in which he

said in part:
I appeal to strikers everywhere to refrain from any act of vio
lence. Let there be no interference with the affairs of the companies

involved, and, above all, let there be no act of depredation. A man
destroy property or violate law, is an enemy, and not a

who will
friend

to

strike is

the

cause

ordered

of labor

....

Let it be understood that this

by myself any other individual; nor is the
strike inaugurated anywhere except by consent and authority from
a
majority of the employees themselves.
not

or

After the entry of the order of December I4, the defend
through their counsel, presented a petition for writ of
error and
supersedeas to Mr. Justice Harlan, and he directed
ants,

counsel under date ofJanuary I2, I895, to present it to the
Supreme Court of the United States in open session. It was
denied January I7.
But on January 9, I895, the day after the incarceration
of the defendants, a petition for habeas corpus and certio
rari was executed for presentation to the same court at the
October term. And it was in this proceeding that arguments
were made in the
Supreme Court on March 25, I895. Here
the issues were finally determined. It is true, indictments
charging criminal conspiracy were filed July IO and July I9,
I894, but, when the trial of these was nearing its close, one
of the jurors became quite ill, and on February I2, I895,
Judge Grosscup, declining to look with favor upon any
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of the motions for the defense, declared a mistrial, dis
charged the jury, and continued the case to May, 1895. It
was never called
up again except to be finally dismissed.
The defendants and their counsel had felt certain of a verdict
of not guilty, and the conduct of the jurors after their dis

charge seemed to confirm the reasonableness of this hope.
As he approached the close of his printed argument be
fore the Supreme Court in the contempt proceeding, Mr.
Gregory
viewed

reached the

it. He

most

expressed

vital aspect of his
this way:

case

as

he

it in

It is the main purpose of this argument to demonstrate the right
of all persons charged with infractions of Federal law to trial by
jury and to show that the position of counsel for the government
and the court below involves a denial of this right as to offenses

against the

question. This

is the most important question in
technical but a substantial and practical question
of the deepest interest and most essential character
It cannot be doubted that without trial by jury civil liberty
could not exist. This does not deny participation of a court nor im
port that life and liberty are to be disposed at the pleasure of the

the

case.

act

It is

in

not a

Dean Levi with

....

unlettered panel. Trial by jury is trial
to decide the law,
thejury the facts.

by court and jury;

He believed

act

that, whenever the

the

ries with it the

equal power to punish for the disobedience of that
order and the inquiry as to
disobedience
the special func
tion of the court
To submit the question of disobedience to
another tribunal, be it a jury or another court, would
operate to
in brief, a court,
deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency
...

court

...

enforcing obedience to its orders by proceedings for contempt is
not
executing the criminal laws of the land but only securing to
suitors the rights which it has adjudged them entitled to.

he said: "That this is the law in strike cases, is now well
settled by the decisions of courts of high authority. That it

compatible

with the

The

spirit of American constitutional law

Statutes

at

Large authorizing steam railroads, for compensa

tion, to carry property from state to state, and with roads
of other states in continuous lines to destination.
On May 27, 1895, the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brewer. The Court
decided all the questions against the petitioners except that
it declined to express any opinion as to whether or not the
act of
July 2, 1890, was applicable. In dealing with the prin
cipal point at issue, the opinion stated:

here, the acts of the defendants mayor may not have been
violations of the criminal law. If they were, that matter is for in
quiry in other proceedings. The complaint made against them in
this, is of disobedience to an order of a civil court, made for the
protection of property and the security of rights
Nor is there in this any invasion of the constitutional
right of
trial by jury
But the power of a court to make an order carSo

...

....

,

was

denied, and this ended the

were

required

to serve

their

jail

sentences.

The Debs

case was

not

the

ory rendered service without
ofMr. Darrow.

committed to memory. Mr. Olney expressed the opinion
that it was quite inadvisable that the jurisdiction of the low
should turn upon the government's technical relalations to the mail and the mailbags or upon the novel pro
vision of an experimental piece of legislation like the act
of 1890. He based his argument on broader grounds, in
sisting that the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and one
other act of Congress furnished ample authority for the
action of the court below. He cited Section 5258 of the

for the writ

Debs and his associates

never concede."
The argument of Richard Olney, the Attorney-General
of the United States, was, according to Mr.
Gregory, ex
cellent and impressive, and he felt certain that it had been

court

petition

case.

I shall

er

...

....

constituting the con
was
a crime, there should be a
tempt
jury trial.
after
the
had
court
this
decided
Long
point against him,

is

students, following the Gregory lecture

On October 28,
.

only one in which Mr. Greg
compensation

1893, Carter H. Harrison,

ly, well-liked

at

the request

genial,

friend

mayor of Chicago, was shot and killed in the
doorwa y of his home by Patrick Eugene
Prendergast, who
thereupon gave himself up at the Desplaines Street Police
Station. It was a dreadful deed. Immediately

public feeling

white heat, and public clamor knew no bounds.
Prendergast was then twenty-five years old. In due
course he was indicted and tried for murder. The defense
was
insanity. During his trial, when the jurors went out for
exercise under escort, crowds swarmed about them and
thirsting for the blood of the prisoner, with threats and vitu
peration, exhorted them to hang him. The jury brought in
a verdict of
guilty.
Upon the hearing of the motion for a new trial, Mr.
Darrow came into the case, and Mr.
Gregory joined him
rose to

at

his request.
The motion

was a

was

motion in

ings followed

as

overruled by Judge Brentano and so
of judgment. Then these proceed

arrest

reported

in the papers:

"Patrick

Eugene Prendergast, stand up.
"Have you anything to say, Mr. Prendergast."
"This plea of insanity, may it please the court, was set up without my consent
infamous plea of insanity-disreputablecareless lawyers
...

.
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Meanwhile Mr. Gregory and Mr. James Harlan tried to
a
judge who would hear a petition for an inquest into
Prendergast's then sanity, based largely on the affidavit of
the prisoner's brother, John Prendergast, to the effect that
find

the prisoner had become insane since his sentence. The
as it relates to this case, is
substantially as follows:

stat

ute,

...

and if, after judgment and before execution of the sentence,

such person becomes lunatic or insane, then in case the punishment
be capital, the execution thereof shall be stayed until the recovery

of said person from the insanity or lunacy. In all of these cases it
shall be the duty of the court to impanel a jury to try the question
whether the accused be, at the time of impaneling, insane or
lunatic.
In connection with my father's participation in the case
he said: "All of the attorneys now defending Prendergast
are
doing it gratuitously, without any possibility of pecuni
A

scene

from

Gregory

the student reception in the Law Lounge following the

ary

reward, and from purely charitable motives."

Before he died,

lecture.

ment as
...

as

reported

"It

the

was

embodied in

me,

Prendergast

in the

gave

Herald, July

spirit of Christ
that made

out

this written

14,

1894:

in me, the character of

kill. For Christ loves

me

state

Christ

humanity

and the elevation of the railroad tracks could only come, as the
spirit of Christ dictated to me, by arousing the minds of the people
by spilling of the mayor's blood. The blood of obscure people was
being spilled day after day. Why not kill the mayor if his killing
would save the killing of thousands? It was one life against many,
and the salvation, the welfare of the many moved the Christ in me
to do the killing. There was no malice. It was not the act of Patrick

.

.

as little responsible as the gun
tool in my hand. I was a tool in

I was

Eugene Joseph Prendergast.
that did the work. The gun
the hands of Christ.

was a

.

only words of thanks to Mr. Gregory, Mr. Heron, Mr.
Darrow and Mr. Harlan and the other lawyers who mistakenly
tried to serve me, for had they put in a plea ofjustification and not
the
r��iculous one of insanity this execution would not take
"I have

Clay Judson and Mr. and Mrs. Robert F. Graham at the reception for
of the Faculty, the Visiting Committee, and the Alumni Board
which preceded the Gregory lecture.

members

"The

question is,

if the

court

please,

did I do

wrong at that particular time? Did I do my duty
the will of God or not? If I did wrong of course I

demned, if I did

Judge

right

I should be justified."

Brentano: "The solemn and

right
or

did I do

or

not? Did I do

ought to

be

con

...

painful duty now

devolves

which
upon me to impose the sentence and judgment of the law,
is that you, Patrick Eugene Prendergast, between the hours of 10

0'clock in the forenoon and 2 0' clock in the afternoon of March 23,
A.D. 1894, in the manner provided by the statute of this state, be
hanged by the neck until you are dead."
...

So much for the newspaper account.
Relief was immediately asked of the

Supreme

Court

by

application for writ of error and supersedeas. It was denied.
On March 21 application for a writ of habeas corpus was
made to the Federal Court before Judges Harlan and Jen
kins. This was denied, and Darrow immediately went to
Springfield to seek, in vain, executive clemency from the
lieutenant-governor, Mr. Gill.

place.

.

..

he had thought he should be made
that he might accomplish track
corporation
elevation in the interest of public safety.
Finall y, twenty-four hours before the time set for the
execution an inquiry was begun before Judge Arthur Chet
lain into the argument that Prendergast had become in
sane since the first trial. The session before the court lasted
through much of the night, resulting in postponement of
the execution, due then to be carried out within a few

Though not lawyer,
a

counsel

so

hours.

Of the selection of Judge Chetlain, Mr. Gregory's part
during his first years in Chicago, he commented as

ner

follows:

Judge Chetlain was as averse to handling this case as
of
the
Judges to whom I applied, and that he consented at
any
last to do so from the purest motives of official obligation. That the
statute required him to do so I have not a shadow of doubt, and,
unless it were absolutely certain that he had no right to act, I think
I

am sure

should have saved him from
he has, in this affair, the
that
know
happen
and support of almost the entire bench. The Judges

his character
severe

as a man

criticism. I

sympathy

and

a

to

Judge

The

Vol. 6'1 No.1
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would not, of course, express an opinion to outsiders, but you will
find out in due time that Judges Tuley, Clifford, Baker, McCon
nell, and practically the entire bench are with him in every step
he has taken.
Moreover, if, under such circumstances, Judges are assailed by
the press, there is danger that they may become afraid to do their
duty, unless they have first got the co�sent of the press, which
would be the ruin of all justice and all liberty. The press ought to
have a much clearer case against a Judge than it has against Judge
Chetlain before it assumes to ruin his reputation and his pros
pects

....

An affidavit ofJohn

Prendergast was presented, touching

the condition of the prisoner's mind since he had been
condemned, and oral testimony was heard byJudge Chetlain
before passing on the application and the affidavit. The
collateral question of some importance raised in the argu
ments was whether or not Judge Chetlain had power to
stay the execution. The judge expressed himself as satisfied
that the affidavit and the evidence he had heard were suffi
on

cient

to

bring

reluctant

to

the

rule

case

on

the

Law School

Eminent
On October

19

Lawyers

The Law School sponsored the first of a pro
series
oflectures
on leaders of the Bar. Mr.
jected
Tappan
of
Gilruth
and Hunter, spoke on the
Gregory
Gregory,
career of his father,
Stephen Strong Gregory. (Mr. Greg
ory's address will be found elsewhere in this issue of the
Record.) Prior to this lecture, the School sponsored a dinner
at the Quadrangle Club for members of the Alumni Board,
the Visiting Committee, and the entering class of students.
Immediately following the lecture there was a reception for
alumni guests, Faculty, and students. This reception was
held in the Law Lounge of Judson Court, immediately ad
joining Mead House, which this autumn became the Law
School Residence.
2

within the statute, but he appeared
question of his right to stay the exe

cution.

Finall y, he ordered a stay until April 4 to allow the
tal condition of the prisoner to be determined.
Later there

was

another stay until

July

2;

men

but when in

Maya stipulation was presented to Judge Payne agreeing

to

defer the trial to the September term and the execution
until November, he refused to accept this stipulation and
set the trial for June 20. It was concluded on July 3, when a
verdict was returned finding the prisoner neither insane
nor a lunatic. The defense had presented the testimony of a
score of witnesses, pre-eminent in reputation and
standing
in the community. Most of them were doctors, and, of
these, the majority were specialists in diseases of the brain.
All the doctors had had broad experience. They all had
visited the prisoner and conferred with him at some
length. They testified as to these visits and the conversa
tions between them and the prisoner and then each stated
that in his opinion the prisoner was insane at the time, and
they stated the basis of their findings. The evidence of the
state was, unimpressive. Meanwhile, the execution had
again been stayed until July 13.

Mrs. Edward H. Levi,

Tenney,
ner

Chairman

which

Tappan Gregory, and,

of the Visiting Committee,

preceded the Gregory

at

right front, Henry

with students

at

the din

lecture.

Application was made immediately after the verdict to
Judge Bailey, of the Illinois Supreme Court, for writ of
error and supersedeas. It was denied. Governor Altgeld,
when appealed to, refused to intervene. Judge Grosscup, of
the Circuit Court of the United States, was then petitioned
a

for

a

writ of habeas corpus, which

was

denied,

as was a

pra yer for appeal to the United States Supreme Court and
request for stay of execution. This was the end. No further
move to save

the condemned

Earlier in the

the
Trude

by

state to
as

case,

in

return

prosecutor,

possible.

continuance

requested
by A. S.
privately employed, Mr.

opposing

permit the

special

man was
a

and participation

Gregory had said:
Continued

on

page

20

Dinner at the

Quadrangle

Club preceding the

Tappan Gregory lecture
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GregoryContinued from page 19

have escaped the attention of the court
honorable exceptions, a desperate effort is made
and being made in the press of this city to see that this defendant
does not secure the justice which this court is bound neither to sell
to any man, nor deny to any man nor to refuse, in the language of
magna charta, and substantially in the.language of our constitu
tion. And I do not desire that opportunity should be given further,
unless, in the view of the court, the interests ofjustice may require
it, to foment, stimulate and strengthen public sentiment to intimi
It

altogether

cannot

that, with

some

date witnesses, break down counsel in the case and bring all these
blighting and destroying influences into the very atmosphere of the
courtroom where the
rights of a man are to be determined and his

right to life,
as

valueless

the counsel

ful. In

though it may be to him. I beg to

say,

far

so

concerned, that these efforts will not be success
the language of the greatest of English advocates, "I shall
are

alter my course." And it would be
that we expect less of the court.
not

impertinent for

me to

brother John was not to
he wished to see him be
fore he died, to thank him for all he tried to do.
The Chicago Evening Post of July 13, 1894, reported:
A few minutes later

Attorney

S. S.

were tears

Gregory

came

in. He

in his eyes when he

was

spoke

to

Sheriff Gilbert.

"This man has sent for me and I would like to see him a
moment."
"He will be hanged in five minutes," replied the sheriff, "and
it will do no good to see him."
"It's

pleaded

not a

Mr.

pleasant thing

for

me,

but he asked

me to

come,"

Gregory.

"Well, you

can see

him and shake hands with him

only,"

said

the sheriff.
Mr. Gregory went back to the prisoner's room and shook
hands with Prendergast, who thanked him for the zeal with
which he had defended him. Then the attorney hurried away
....

Prendergast was hanged on the thirteenth of July. The
proceeding to inquire as to his then sanity authorized by
Judge Chetlain was unusual at that time, although it has
since become

a

not uncommon

practice.

earlier cases in the Supreme
Court of the United States-and he argued quite a few be
fore that exalted tribunal-was the case of Cornell Univer
sity v. Fiske, decided in his favor in the spring of 1890. He
and his associates represented the surviving husband and
heirs at law and next of kin ofJennie McGraw Fiske.
At the close of the argument there was handed to Mr.
Gregory a plain white card, bearing the notation, "Excel
lent argument. H." The "H" stood for Justice Harlan.
Perhaps the most important case that my father argued
before the United States Supreme Court was the so-called
Lake Front case, Illinois Central R. Co. v. People of the State
of Illinois. In this case he was associated with John S. Miller.
They represented the city of Chicago. The case was de
cided in December, 1892, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Field.

Among

Mr.

Gregory's

lecture.

say

Prendergast's last word to his
neglect telling Mr. Gregory that

much affected and there

Coffee in the Law Lounge at the student reception following the Gregory

The railroad claimed title. to certain submerged land
under the waters of Lake Michigan by virtue of an act of
the Illinois legislature passed April 16, 1869. Section 3 of
this act purported to grant title in fee to these submerged
lands to the railroad. This act was repealed by the act of

April

15,

1873.

The court held that the title of the state to the submerged
lands was held in trust for the people of the state that they
might "enjoy the navigation of the waters, carryon com

them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed
from the obstruction or interference of private parties."
The state, therefore, the court held, had no right to convey
any of these lands to the railroad, and the act of April 15,
merce over

1873, was effective to repeal the earlier act.
The railroad, however, held title to certain land reaching
to the edge of Lake
Michigan but not submerged. This
carried riparian rights and gave the railroad ownership of
its piers, wharves, and docks out into the lake to the point
where the water was navigable.
By act of the legislature and ordinance of the city the

railroad was granted the right to lay its tracks and construct
its works within the city limits.
The last question concerned the rights of the city of Chi
cago. It was thus stated by the court:
The claim of the

alleys,

city

ways, commons,

is

to

the

and other

ownership in fee of the streets,
public grounds on the east front

of the city bordering on the lake, as exhibited on the maps show
ing the subdivisions of fractional sections ten and fifteen, prepared
under the supervision and direction of United States officers in the

the Canal commissioners in the other, and duly
to such ownership.
By
a statute of Illinois the
making, acknowledging, and recording of
the plats operated to vest the title to the streets, alleys, ways and
commons, and other public grounds designated on such plats, in
the city, in trust for the public uses to which they were applicable.
one case

and

by

recorded, and the riparian rights attached

These lots
The

had

a

lay between the Chicago River and Park Row.

court

right

said that the fact that the land which the city
fill in and appropriate as riparian owner had

to
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been filled in by the railroad in its construction work did
deprive the city of its riparian rights. The exercise of
these rights was subject only to the city's agreement with
the railroad giving it a perpetual right of way for its tracks
and the continuance of the breakwater as a protection
against the violence of the lake. The court went on to say
that the city as riparian owner, and in virtue of the authority
conferred by its charter, "has the power to construct and
keep in repair on the lake front, east of said premises, within
the lines mentioned, public landing places, wharves, docks,
in the execution of that pow
the authority of the State to prescribe the lines beyond
which piers, docks, wharves, and other structures other
than those erected by the general government, may not be
extended into the navigable waters of the harbor, and to
such supervision and control as the United States may
rightfull y exercise."
It was really a great triumph for the city.
James S. Harlan, son of Mr. Justice Harlan, then sitting
on the
Supreme Court, wrote, saying: "A letter received
from father this morning says that Mr. Justice Field spoke
most
handsomely of your brief in the Lake Front case."
The Chicago Herald published this brief interview with

Pardon Board. The execution

June

was

not

the

for the first time?"

an

Gregory was greatly pleased over the decision and all day
the recipient of congratulations from brother lawyers
in this city and in the east.

Mr.

both

was

whether or not the point in question was new, the
court said: "We cannot, it is true, cite
any authority where
kind
a
of
this
has
been
held
invalid, for we believe
grant
that no instance exists where the harbor of a great city and
its commerce have been allowed to pass into the control of
As

corporation."
Chicago Record of December

6, I892,

reported:

People talked about it on the streets. The "lake-front case" had
been decided in favor of the city, and Chicago received the news
with a metropolitan smile. Business men expressed their satisfac
loud,jubilant voices; lawyers eagerly inquired for the full
of the celebrated decision, and everyone, with the exception
of the comparatively few who are interested in the Illinois Central
railroad, was unfeignedly delighted that the United States Supreme
court thought just as 1,500,000 Chicago citizens
always did think
that the city, and not the Illinois Central railroad, owned the lake
front.
tion in
text

in I890, Mr. Gregory had also repre
that
case he and
city.in
John P. Wilson success
the
defended
and
maintained
fully
constitutionality of the
act establishing the Sanitary District of Chicago.
In

an

earlier

case,

sented the

Perhaps I should mention one other case involving an ap
plication for a writ of habeas corpus.
Herman Billik was sentenced in April, I908, to hang for
the murder by poisoning of Mary Vrzal. He was accused of

was

made

to

the Supreme Court

to

grant

a

ground of newly discovered evidence. It
rejected. Early in the week before BiHik was to die,
trial

on

the

lowed in these words: "As he
I

to

any private
And the

Friday,

to

On the day before the sentence was to be carried out an
application for a writ of habeas corpus was presented before
Judge Landis. It was denied.
An appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
was
prayed on the ground of infringement of constitutional
rights. Judge Landis at first announced that he would not
grant an appeal. But it was argued that Billik was entitled
to it as a matter of right. At the end of the
day the judge
was still in some doubt and
adjourned court without an
nouncing his decision. Mr. Gregory described what fol

"I believe it is."

long

deferred

the Pardon Board considered his case again but refused to
recommend commutation of the sentence. Further post
ponement was also refused.

point you and Mr. Miller raised that the state had no
irrevocable grant, one presented to the Supreme

court

give

was

I2.

Application
new

Gregory:
to

named Vrzal and four of his chil
poison had been administered
Vrzal, a son, was one of the state's

a man

claimed that the

affirmed in the Supreme Court, asked Mr. Gregory to act
with Mr. Hinckley in trying to save the life of the con
demned man-without compensation, I am sure. On Easter
Saturday they appeared before Governor Deneen and the

er, to

right

was

by Vrzal's wife. Jerry
principal witnesses. He recanted and declared that nearly all
the substantial parts of his testimony were false. The judg
ment was affirmed in the Supreme Court and
rehearing
denied. Father P. J. O'Callaghan, of the Paulists, had be
come interested in the case and, after the
judgment had been

and levees, subject, however,

"Is
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having poisoned
dren. It

not

Mr.

Law School

.

suggested

to

was

about

to

leave the bench

him, taking the district attorney

into

our

counsel, that he could communicate by telephone or other
wise with ChiefJustice Melville W. Fuller, who happened
to

be

on a

visit

to

Chicago,

on

Landis looked

appeal. Judge
thoughtful silence,

the
at

subject

me

for

of our
a

right

moment

of
in

and then left the bench."

By the next morning the scaffold had been erected and
the rope made ready. Judge Landis first secured assurance
from the district attorney that he would have time to give
his decision before the hanging and then announced that
he had decided that Billik was entitled to an appeal and that
the appeal stayed all proceedings until it was disposed of,

which could

not

be until the

following

October.

long afterward my father met the ChiefJustice and
was told that "in order to
prevent gross abuses in the way
of applying to the federal courts on frivolous grounds to
interfere with the execution of capital sentences imposed
by the state," Congress in the preceding March had passed
Not

taking away the right to appeal, which had before
been absolute, except where the judge who had heard the
application or a Justice of the Supreme Court should certify
that there was reasonable doubt as to the merits of the ap
plication. Neither Judge Landis nor counsel for the defense
nor for the
prosecution knew of this statute. Had the judge
communicated with the ChiefJustice, he would have been

a statute
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advised of the new statute, the application would have been
denied, and Billik would have been hanged.
As it was, although the appeal was dismissed under the
new

statute,

tence was,

life

and Billik

by

the

was

clemency

resentenced to hang, the sen
of the governor, commuted to

imprisonment.

One of my father's later

the United States

was

cases

Donnell

v.

in the

Supreme

he said that it was his belief that "the ideal State
should interfere as little as possible with personal liberty."
He believed that "men and nations develop most rapidly
and along the highest lines under a condition ofjust as little
state" interference in these matters as is possible." And he
added:

ample,

Court of

Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe

Co., et al., decided in his favor in the fall of 1906. It was a
rather complicated matter, decided for the other side in
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and then reversed the court below.
My father had written his brief with that "grace of style and
literary touch," the absence of which in those da ys he depre
cated, and later the Chief Justice complimented him on his

presentation.
These few cases typify the character of professional en
deavor that occupied much of Mr. Gregory's time. He ar
gued, of course, many cases in the Supreme Court of Illi
nois and in the Appellate Court, in addition to those in the
United States Supreme Court and the hundreds he tried
in the courts of first instance. His cases reflect to some ex
tent his character and his ideals. But this is also true of much
that he expressed publicly or in private correspondence,
which never became a part of litigated matters.
In his correspondence with Samuel Gompers, for ex-

Certainly in our

system of government, and

particularly under

the

provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con
stitution it is impossible, without changing the organic law, to en

obligation of men to work. This has always been
apparently clearly appreciated by the advocates of
compulsory arbitration in labor and industrial disputes. To compel
men to work, even under the most liberal conditions prescribed by
law, would be to establish involuntary servitude contrary to the
prohibition of that Amendment. This was decided by the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals in the Seventh Circuit in the Northern
force the natural

a

feature

not

Pacific strike

case.

Among his many comments on various aspects of the
administration of justice was a condemnation of the prac
tice of some judges of criticizing the verdicts of juries be

...

fore them in criminal
Mr.

cases.

Gregory was always opposed to capital punishment,

characterizing it as a "barbaric survival of the bloody crimi
nal code of Great Britain, under which in the beginning of
the last century it was possible to send to the gallows a poor
young woman who started to steal a few shillings worth of
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Law School

calico," and said that

any attempt

ishment would be

power, that

enlightened

in his judgment this method of pun
ultimately abandoned in all civilized and

communities.

what

principles lay
closest to his heart, I should say that these certainly included
the perfecting of the administration ofjustice for the benefit
of all and the maintenance of liberty for the whole human
Were I

to

express

opinion

an

as

to

race.

On these standards there

that
fear

was

for him

no

compromise;

possessed of that degree of courage and integrity
prompted him to stand fast and speak out without

and he

was

favor.

or

He

thought in

1888 that

we

should have

a

Code of Civil

reasoning, as it appears in an item in the
Albany Law Journal, is interesting, his exposition forthright
and vigorous. He is quoted in these words:
With a singular but perverted conservatism, we have retained
Procedure. His

the very husks and refuse of the common law, which have been
abandoned by every other jurisdiction where that system obtains,
including England, and upon this system grafted innovations of
our

own,

thus destroying those features of the

common

law which

in other governments have survived the existence of its forms and
been approved as enduring institutions of their jurisprudence.

He

spoke feelingly

on

procedural

reform:

endeavoring to fix some difficult
language of the last decision of
interpretation
All hope for the future is founded upon
the Supreme Court
the vitality of truth and the mortality of error. In so far as the law
yer fortified by musty precedent and hoary tradition wars with
this principle he is untrue to himself and to his profession; he cum
And
bers the ground and justifies the reproaches of our critics
to the necessities for the intelligent amendment of the law relating
to legal procedure, we must be keenly alive. We must not adhere
Too much time is wasted in

and strained

on

the

23

to insist that stupidity is the equal of intellectual
mediocrity is on par with genius, that the rank and
file of society should necessarily and in all things move in the same

orbit

as

a

its great leaders.

politics he was a Democrat. He served in 1886 as
president of the Iroquois Club, which in those days was
probably the leading Democratic club in the West.
His interest in politics and good government was lively
and sustained, even extending at times to participation from
the hustings in local campaigns. It never included any am
In

bition on his part
what he would do

to
to

hold office, but there was no limit to
help a deserving friend who was really

worthy of recognition. He always kept up a continuing
correspondence with leaders of his party in various parts of
the country and with those holding high office not only in
Washington but in the different states. He had definite,
comprehensive ideas as to how the success of campaigns for
important office could be best promoted, which subjects
should be developed and what let alone, and his views,
which he never hesitated to express, always seemed to re
ceive respectful consideration. Not infrequently he was
consulted by attorneys-general, solicitors-general, and
Presidents of the United States as to the qualifications of
lawyers in this part of the country for high judicial office.
Among those asking his judgment were Wickersham,
McReynolds, T. W. Gregory, Theodore Roosevelt, Taft,
and Wilson.

....

....

to

venerable forms

at

the expense of substance and the sacrifice of

justice.

After the election of Woodrow Wilson, a number of
Gregory's friends, individually but unsuccessfully,
sought leave from him to urge the President to appoint him
Mr.

Attorney-General or Solicitor-General. He had been more
or less
prominently mentioned in the public press in con
nection with the office of Attorney-General. Some wrote to
the President without Mr. Gregory's leave or knowledge,
and his name was also suggested on occasion for the Su-

He also said:
It has been often remarked and

nothing paralyzes
form of paralysis

a

frequently demonstrated,

seems to

nothing appeases a body of lawyers like
to regulate everything under the sun.
we
commonly select those who have most

It is also true that

pointing

Committees

these Committees

that

giving him an office. A milder
follow appointment to a committee.

reformer like

ap
For
vo

ciferously denounced the wrongs which we aim to redress, but
who, having thus roared in most leonine fashion to an admiring
audience, suddenly relapse into oppressive and lamblike silence,
when assigned to duty.

organized bar was
elected president of the Chicago Bar
Association in 1899 and of the Illinois State Bar Association
in 1904, as well as holding the same high office in the Ameri
can Bar Association from 19II to 1912. He was also
presi
His

experience

extensive, for he

in the activities of the

was

dent of the Law Club of Chicago, where

lawyers met peri

odically and exchanged ideas.
In February, 1920, he wrote:
All

men were

there should be

a

undoubtedly created equal before the law, and
struggle for this. There should not, however, be

Title and Trust Foundation Scholars, left to right, first
Feige/son, Richard Goodman, Mrs. Amy
Scupi, Alden Guild; second row: Ronald Finch, Charles Lewis,
Robert Martineau, Walter Clements; third row: Dallin H. Oaks,
Joe Sutherland, James Beaver, B. Z. Goodwin.
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row:

Chicago

Mrs. Miriam Chesslin
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preme Court and sometimes for the Court of Appeals.
He did not believe in a third term for the President of
the United States. Speaking of Theodore Roosevelt, he

made this

significant

statement:

But if a third term, why not
a Third Term
Again,
fourth? Can anyone who appreciates the doughty Colonel's im
perious and ruthless nature suppose for a moment that if in 1916
the notion of running again appeals to him, he will not discover
some
great public emergency, some irresistible popular demand

he seeks

....

a

which will again compel him
forced upon him?

Writing

to

M.

J.

to a

sacrifice similar

those

to

now

The great

thing

Dickinson, former Secretary of War,

in government is

so

many

liberty.

I

am

against all

these

think it necessary to
and I believe sincerely,-not

statesmen seem to

upon all our essential rights,
personal equality, for there is no such thing,-but I
in the equality of men and women too before the law.

do believe

"I

want no

impose
in

On

July

9, 1905,

he stated

unequivocally,

office."
But when Joseph E. Davies, chairman of the Federal
Trade Commission, offered him a retainer as special counsel
to the Commission for a few months, he accepted and for a
year or so spent about half his time in assisting in the
establishment of the Commission and the organization of

its

procedures.
Perhaps partly

at least because he never held public
for
two
office, except
years as election commissioner, he
was able to render many services pro bono
publico which
would otherwise have been impossible; and these services

always in litigated matters.
Typical of such matters was what he did to inspire the
following letter from Mother Frances X. Cabrini, superior
general of the Missionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart, dated
February 27, 1905. She wrote:

were not

Allow

me

marks made

to

thank you for the

during

the exercises

and kind re
afternoon.
I am sensible
yesterday
most

interesting

that your talents were very necessary in promoting and perfecting
the success of the program. I feel confident that you are wholly
deserving of the many expressions of appreciation that it is possible

for the sisters and
measure.

myself to give utterance to.

It is safe

to state

that

the occasion referred to, were pleased beyond
That you will lend every energy toward the success of

the guests present

on

the hospital is already a foregone conclusion.
The sisters and myself feel all the gratitude that it is possible for
this short letter to express, giving it the most flattering con
struction

their
in

problems. He taught in the John Marshall Law School
Chicago from the time of its foundation until he died,

about twenty years later. He did this without compensation
and because he thought it would help some young people
to secure a legal education which would otherwise be be
yond their slender resources.
His views
were

and

his

they

on

many

problems

were

positive, and they

however unconventional they
arrived at only after careful and

own,
were

might be;
thoughtful

consideration,
He believed that the Sherman Antitrust Law and similar

in December of 1916, he said:

restrictions which
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The occasion referred to was the dedication of the Co
lumbus Hospital. Later Mother Cabrini asked him for a
copy of his remarks, but he was unable to comply with her
request because what he had said was entirely extempora
neous. After her death she was canonized-a great and

good woman.
Throughout his life my father maintained a lively
sympathetic interest in young people, their troubles,

should be

repealed. In his view monopolies re
production of better goods at lower cost were
sulting
unless
they became oppressive and injurious by
salutary
to the public the benefit of lower costs in
to
failing
give
lower prices. If some sort of regulation by government
state statutes

in the

should then become necessary, it was his opinion that it
should be accomplished by regulation of rate or price as in
the case of public utilities.

thought that judges in Cook County should be ap
pointed for life with power in the legislature after a short
period of years to provide by law for the recall ofjudges by
popular vote in the county. Basicall y this is not very dif
He

ferent from the system

now

in

operation

in Missouri-the

American Bar Association

plan.
deprecated the tendency of the courts to annul or
sustain legislation theoretically upon constitutional con
siderations but actually because they consider it wise or
unwise, thus substituting judicial for legislative wisdom,
not altogether consistent with the principles of popular
He

government.
In the first World War he himself did what he could

as

member of the Chicago Bar Association War Service
Committee and of the Cook County Fuel Commission,

a

and before I left for France he said he thought my chance of
surviving the close of hostilities better than his because of
his age. How nearly right he was is demonstrated by the
fact that he survived my return by little more than sixteen
months.
He was exceedingly patriotic-proud of the strength and
spirit and power of this peace-loving nation when once
aroused and committed to the conflict; bitter toward the
German government and leaders; scornful of the pro
nouncements of those who would offer to negotiate for
peace before we were fairly launched in combat. To him
the idea that a nation should not defend itself when threat
ened was like telling a man not to defend himself when
under assault or threat of murder.
He believed in universal military training.
In the fall of 1919, after the race riots in Chicago, he
publicly volunteered his services without compensation,
"as leading counsel, to protect the legal interests of, and se
cure
equal justice for, all colored men indicted in the Chi

and

cago Riots situation."
Late in 1920 he was made editor-in-chief of the American

and

Bar Association

Journal in

its

new

form

as a

monthly publi-
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cation, but he lived

only long enough

to

University of Chicago

make up

two

Issues.

I venture to quote very briefly from addresses made at
memorial exercises for him on May 20, 192I.
Clarence Darrow said:
...

The

that aroused the fiercest

case

Chicago has ever seen

that

was

opposition

the Anarchists'

of

case.

anything
One time

much as a man's life to say a critical word of
Gregory said it. I am not pretending to suggest
whether he was right or wrong; neither did he; but he did believe
that no man or set of men in the temper of the people at that time
it

worth almost

...

was

the

case

a
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But slowly my arm grew weary, upholding the
shining load,
And my tired feet went stumbling over the hilly road,
And I fell with the torch beneath me. In a moment the flame
was

out!

Then, lo! from the throng
shout,

a

stripling

sprang forth with

a

mighty

Caught up the torch as it smouldered and lifted it high again
Till fanned by the winds of heaven it fired the souls of men!

as

but Mr.

could have

Law School

fair trial.

Dean Edward T. Lee of the

John

And as I lay in darkness, the feet of the trampling crowd
Passed over and far beyond me, its peans proclaimed aloud,
While I learned, in the deepening shadows, this glorious verity;
'Tis the torch that the people follow whoever the bearer be!

Marshall Law School

him this tribute:

paid

was well and
accurately informed on men and events of the
and his observations and criticisms were always wise, funda
mental, and considerate. His extensive and intimate acquaintance

He

day,

with

prominent

thirty
He

men

years gave

was a

in local and national

unique

value

to

pure-minded, dean-speaking

vulgar word

of double

or one

He carried himself the
court-room, in

the

same

history during

his conversation
man,

who

at

the last

such times.

never

uttered

a

meaning.
way in public as in private, in the
in committee meetings and in

class-room,

assemblies. He was a steady, noiseless worker, a self-deter
mining, self-contained man, with all his resources quickly available

large

never hurried, never worried, never mud
would have liked to meet. "Strong and con
tent I travel the open road" seemed his attitude towards life. He
He was of aristocratic
accepted the universe and feared it not
manners but of democratic
principles; appreciative of merit wher

and

at

dled,

his command,

a man

Emerson

....

and whenever it

appeared, neither obsequious to the rich and
powerful nor patronizing to the poor and obscure, met all on the
same level;
despised class distinction and artificial passports to
ever

recognition.

Alexander C. Castles,

British Commonwealth Fellow for 1956-57.
agraduate of the Law School of the University of Mel
bourne. After receiving his LL.B. and LL.M. degrees, he joined the
fac
ulty at Melbourne as a Tutor in Torts and Contracts.
a

Mr. Castles is

He was what he desired to be, an attorney representing at the
bar of justice those unable to plead for themselves; a counselor,
ever ready to set straight the feet of his client in the
path of the law
and to teach him respect for law. But he aspired to be more than
that,-to be a useful citizen, to help mould our democratic society,
and to live the life of a generous, hospitable, upright man; and he
succeeded.

On October 23, 1920, he

the

car

taking

him

football game. In
a few
his doctor called and left him com
went to a

home, he lost consciousness for

seconds. That evening
fortable and happy. He slept immediately upon retiring
soundly and quietly. That was his last, long sleep; for at
one-thirty the next morning, without moving or opening
his eyes, he slipped peacefully into eternity.
This poem by Elizabeth R. Finley appealed to him

greatly:
The God of the Great Endeavor gave me a torch to bear.
I lifted it high above me in the dark and
murky air,
And straightway with loud hosannas, the crowd acclaimed its
And followed

light

carried my torch thro' the starless night;
Till mad with the people's praises and drunken with vanity
I forgot 'twas the torch that drew them and fancied
they followed
me.

me as

I

Brinsley D. Inglis, a British Commonwealth Fellow for 1956-57. Mr.
Inglis has received the LL.B. and LL.M. degreesfrom the Law Faculty
of Victoria University College in New Zealand. He lectured there on
Conjlict of Lawsfor a yearfollowing his graduation and then entered into
practice in Wellington. Both he and Mr. Castles will spend a year at the
Law School in the study of American Law.
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But it has

LeviContinued from page

11

be absolute, of course, because
ucts would be substituted; and,
not

at some

level other

prod

given time, competitors

would increase their production. He shares these deficien
cies, however, with firms of greater proportionate magni
tude, although the effect of his action would not be so great
or so lasting. Nevertheless, such a lesser firm could be
regarded, although the law has not done so, as possessing

illegal monopoly

power.
The decision of the law

regard such lesser firms
exercising illegal monopoly power probably reflects a
judgment that the law should not interfere where the mag
nitude of the monopoly effect is not great. I note that Dr.
Stocking in his article on the Cellophane case states that
"detecting monopoly is simpler than measuring it" and
that he quotes Fritz Machlup as being "probably correct"
in "concluding that 'so many different elements enter into
what is called a monopolistic position and .so complex are
their combined effects that a measurement of "the" degree
of monopoly is even conceptually impossible.'" But I
would question whether detecting monopoly for the pur
not to

as

oflaw
pose of bringing the coercive force
matter can

magnitude.
Cellophane

be

so

The

to

bear upon the

easily separated from the problem of its
problem is of course illustrated by the

one can accept the fact that in
control over 75 per cent of a
had
Cellophane
"market" and yet conclude that the albeit imperfect sub
stitutability of other products may limit the magnitude of
control sufficiently, so that the coercive force of law need

where

case,

some sense

applied. It would be extremely difficult, as has been
suggested, to measure the magnitude of the monopoly. But
a Court
possibly might be forgiven for recognizing the
availability of near-substitutes which it has seen by visiting
the I952 Annual Packaging Show at Atlantic City.
not

be

The choice of the law then seems to be not to interfere
monopoly power. The magnitude of the power is
taken into account, although without much precision. I am

with all

Justice Reed can know, as he writes in
Cellophane opinion, that "one can hardly say that brick

not sure

the

how Mr.

tried

never

the market

to

reach all firms which
their

price by curtailing

It is difficult

to

own

can

change

production.

say that the choice should have been

thing we recognize and accept through
the market many forms of minor monopoly power.
The existence of minor monopoly power in the form of
advantages of location or product differentiation has some
otherwise. For

one

out

to
argue the inevitability of monopoly
small
both
and
power,
large. I do not see how this confusion
is helpful, but it suggests that we really are not much
concerned with the minor and more transient forms of

times been used

monopoly

of small

magnitude.

A

more

important point

is

toward the less obvious cases of
various
difficulties arise. Not the least of
monopoly power,
these is that the law gets converted more and more into a
kind of supervision of industry. This is particularly true if

that,

once

the law

moves

industry's cost structure, and the reasons for it, and the
profits and the explanation for them are permitted
or
required to be an issue in the case. Presumably, the argu
ments of justification will become more difficult to evalu
ate, and the standard of application probably will be less
clear than it is now. Although it would not help on the
problem of market definition, a partial escape would be
to suggest an arbitrary and, in this context, lower percent
the

firm's

even if this were feasible,
age rule and hold fast to it. But,
the argument for this is less compelling when it has not been

shown that concentration has

significantly

increased.

often is made that special consideration
should be given to the problem of oligopoly. Hence a dis
tinction is made between the single firm oflesser monopoly
size and power which exists in an area where there are
many competitive firms of small size and the single firm
which exists alongside of a few other firms of somewhat
similar size. In the latter case it is suggested that an inherent
propensity toward joint action permits or compels the
aggregation of the several units so that a level of undoubted
monopoly strength is visible. The law's approach to this
But the argument

accomplished either through a
doctrine of conspiracy which would permit the aggregation
or, without conspiracy, by treating the existence of the
could be

special problem

with steel or wood or cement or stone in the
of
Sherman Act litigation." It seems rather that in
meaning
case
a
they might be thought to compete. I believe
given
the point is rather that the Sherman Act, on the monopoly
side, is reserved for the more obvious cases of monopolies

other firms as one of the circumstances of the market adding
to the monopoly strength of each of the firms. Both the
Paramount case and the second American Tobacco case

magnitude. In this sense the percentage of market con
trol and the availability of imperfect substitutes are both
relevant. The question of monopoly profits has been con
sidered less relevant; the law's emphasis has been on price
or
production control and not on the presence of rewards.
It should be said that the law, through concepts of attempts
to monopolize and conspiracies to monopolize, and by
emphasizing intent or particular abusive acts, has reached
firms with monopoly power considerably less than that of
the Alcoa type. It must be said also that it has not always

what easier for the

competed

with

known what

to

do with them after it has reached them.

adopting or did adopt the first approach. The
approach through the doctrine of conspiracy is made some
came near

to

law, because conspiracy

in

antitrust

least the im

be based on agreement,
can be found in a common concert of
action, sometimes popularly described by the somewhat
discredited phrase "conscious parallelism." But the legal
relief which would follow as the result of a successful case
based on this theory need not curtail the power of the in
dividual firm. The agreement or conspiracy can be treated
cases

plied

as an

not

at

agreement

illegal

act

appended

to

a

position of otherwise legiti

power. On the other hand, a successful case brought
the theory that in the circumstances of the industry the

mate
on

need

or
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power.
Difficulties

situation, in a sea of doubt, caught between the prototype
of monopoly and that of competition. But in the main the
choice of the law has been, as I have suggested, to reserve
its scope of prohibition for the cases of more assured mo

specific agreements should be irrelevant. A large jump is
likely/to be involved in reasoning which moves from a find

nopoly strength. It has chosen in the main to be an anti
monopoly law and not law in favor of all competition
possible. Such choice may leave untouched large area
of economic power, although perhaps it is somewhat diffi
cult to know what is meant by this term.

individual firm was guilty of monopolizing presumably
would have to deal directly with the question of allowable
are involved under either theory. Under the
doctrine of conspiracy the best evidence would appear to
be specific agreements, whereas under the rationale for giv
ing special consideration to the problem of oligopoly the

ing of specific agreements
sion that there is

among the firms.

a

on some matters to

general partnership

Indeed, the need

to

in

have

a

strong attempt has been made to
prevent the creation of monopoly
change
in its incipiency and so in this way to avoid for the future
cases oflesser
monopoly power. The attempt has been made
also to curb conduct thought to be based upon and perhaps
In this situation

the conclu

the law

monopolizing
specific agree

may suggest general rivalry and not inherent com
action. If there is anything to this suggestion, the case

ments
mon

a

a

a

so as to

further lesser monopoly power. I refer to the prohibition
of mergers and other conduct such as price discrimination
or exclusive
arrangements which in the language of the
Act
Clayton
may have the effect of substantially lessening

situation, with or
approach is made
conspiracy,
the
on a
presence of oligopolies
straight monopoly theory.
fashioned as a result of decrees in monopoly cases would be

to

an

abiding embarrassment. It is not unlikely this embarrass
would multiply as new distinctions would have to be
made to justify more or less competition or larger or

competition

ment

ton

smaller size for various industries. Of course it can be said
that such distinctions are inevitable when an antimonopoly
law is applied. But the problems arising out of them seem

Robinson-Patman Act has

for

special

less

acute

treatment

of the

oligopoly

is weakened. If the

without

when the law is

applied only

to

largely

ments

efficiency.
situation is

monopoly
oligopoly
thought to rest on an inherent propensity toward

joint action, unless a somewhat doubtful economic assertion
is to be converted into an irrefutable assumption oflaw, the
issue of how much joint action there has been, and how

rivalry, will be present in all these cases.
It is obvious that many of these theoretical and practical
difficulties arise out of a desire to curtail economic power,
even though the economic power does not flow from a full
monopoly position. It is the monopoly of the single firm

much

an
industry, even though there is a problem of
the
market, which is more readily detected. And
defining
there is less reason then for measuring the consequences of
the firm's position, for they can be predicted theoretically.

occupying

And while the firm may be allowed to justify its position
because monopoly was thrust upon it, not even the rule of
reason
requires an inquiry into effect. When monopoly

restraints, however, are thought to encompass position and
behavior further removed from the status and consequences
of the single firm occupying a market, the law loses its guide
for action. It finds itself, as Judge Taft stated in a related

Act has been

cover a

amount

substantial number of outlets and

of

products.

The

new

a

Automobile

Dealer Franchise Act creates a new right of action to com
pel manufacturers to act "in good faith" in connection with
dealer franchises. And there is a strong movement to have
a law enacted which will require notification to the gov
ernment, the furnishing of information, and a waiting

period

the

power in the

monopoly. The Clay

jeopardized price differences.
interpreted to pre
Clayton
exclusive
some
dealing arrange
qualifications,

which

substantial

of scale, has a greater burden to overcome. As one moves
downward in the scale of market control, however, not
only will there be more cases, but the balance between
curbing lesser monopoly effects and yet giving due regard

And if the

to create a

prohibition of mergers has been strengthened,
through the inclusion of asset acquisitions. The

vent, with

the firms of quite

efficiency argument will be harder to strike. Since the
rewards of lesser monopoly power are less certain, size is
more
likely to have been caused by the requirements of

of tending

Section 3 of the

high percentage of market control. With such firms the
monopoly effects are presumably great, and the argument
in favor of dispensation for them, because of the efficiencies

to

or

Act's

.

before

a

merger

maybe

consummated.

The attempt to have more stringent prohibition of merg
ers-and the pre-merger notification bill must be regarded
attempt both to supervise and to prevent-is presuma
based
on two
arguments. The first is that any merger
bly
reduces the number of competitors. This argument has
force, of course, only if it is assumed that the reduction
makes for a difference worth talking about. The second

as an

argument is that growth through merger is likely not to be
the most efficient growth responding to the economies of
scale. But of course there may be genuine economies of
scale in growth, even though the growth is through merger.
And assuming the existence of what is called a relatively
few firms, the resulting capacity of the industry may be

appropriate if growth

through merger. Since it is
prohibit all mergers, some
possible
standard will have to be used by the law in prohibiting
particular mergers. That standard undoubtedly must relate
to market control, although it might encompass questions
of efficiency and capacity in the industry. The central ques
tion surely is not whether the growth takes place through

more

not

or

desirable

is

to

merger but rather the result ofthe merger in
must

is

terms

of power

possible justification. Separate antimerger legislation
proceed upon the basis, however, that power which
allowable when obtained through internal growth may

and
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be denied

to

growth through

merger, because the

the law, in any event, is that antimerger legislation, while
a means of
growth, attempts to infuse into the
law a double standard of market control. This division of

means

effect.
Actually the standard used for the prohibition of mergers
in the Clayton Act is most unclear. Perhaps the most that
can be said about it is that the standard is intended to
go
used

create a

presumption concerning

motive

emphasizing

or

beyond the Sherman Act but not too far. The allowable
limits of economic or monopoly power are to be decreased
when mergers are involved. But the.Clayton Act applies
not only to horizontal mergers but to vertical and
conglom
erate as well. The inclusion of vertical
integration is under
standable, since there is a widely held belief that vertical
integration gives a leverage for the creation of greater
monopoly power. It may be suggested that this theory is
usually wrong except in the unique case where vertical
integration in foreclosing an outlet to a competitor happens
to place a greater cost on the competitor than on the
acquiring company by this maneuver. The inclusion of
conglomerate mergers suggests that the antimerger legisla
tion need be not about monopoly power at all but about
size or some economic power which is hard- to defme or to
understand and therefore will be equally hard to enforce.
But probably what is intended is a general move downward
in the scale toward lesser monopoly power, although why
such power should be more dangerous in the hands of a
firm operating in several industries rather than in only one

.

explain.
justification for special antimerger legislation is not
obvious. The justification does not ring true if it is based
on
any special inadequacy in the relief given by courts when
monopoly has been achieved through merger. On the
contrary, the difficulties of obtaining adequate relief are
greater when monopoly is achieved through internal
growth. Nor can it be said that special legislation was re
quired so that the law would give special scrutiny in mo
nopoly cases to those instances where the growth was
through acquisitions, for this always has been the emphasis
under Section II of the Sherman Act. Perhaps it will be
said that mergers should be prevented, since they lead to
ward concentration, although the results of the mergers do
not always show up as a monopolized market, because there
are
countervailing tendencies. But, if this is so, then there is
less need for governmental intervention. The difficulty for
is

not

easy

to

The

Standards is not reinforced by new
learning reflected in new
concepts of market control. It is a different and more diver
gent double standard than has existed to some degree in the
Sherman Act up to now. It will be difficult to maintain
such a double standard. It has been said that the idea is not
so much to have a double substantive standard but rather
to have the courts and the Federal Trade Commission
pre
vent individual mergers on the basis of more doubtful
proof. This suggests a dubious limitation of freedom, in
that generally we would not want to have courts accept
doubtfUl proof, particularly when it has not been shown
that mergers have resulted in a significant increase in the
level of concentration almost since the turn of the century.
I do not wish to overemphasize the newness of the tend
encies to push the antitrust laws into operation against the

lesser forms of monopoly
encies have existed for
more

laws

to

economic power. These tend

character of the antitrust laws. The antitrust
non-regulatory only when they are not in frequent

are

interference with business decisions-when the laws are
reserved for cases of larger monopoly power and for tra
ditional restraints such as price-fixing thought to have the
same effect as
larger mono pol y power. The curtailment of
exclusive arrangements and the regulation of pricing poli
cies under the Clayton and the Robinson-Patman acts, the
regulation of mergers (horizontal, vertical, and conglomer
ate) and the suggested pre-merger notification bill, the spe
cial act requiring good faith behavior of automobile manu
facturers in connection with franchises-all these reflect a
movement to convert the
antimonopoly laws into fair
when
fre
quent government inspection of business practices in formal
hearings, with the necessity for justification, for the sub
mission of data and the
requirement of delay. Perhaps,
there
is
reason
to
then,
pause before a law which has sym
bolized free enterprise is converted into but another con
geries of regulatory statutes for the control of business.

practice regulatory
there is
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difficult

or

long time. But it is becoming much
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a
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not

statutes.

prohibition.

Regulation

It includes the

exists

even

continual

or

